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Christina Hawkins Stringfellow
Loyola University of Chicago
DESEGREGATION POUCIES AND PRACTICES IN CHICAGO
DURING THE SUPERINTENDENCIES OF
JAMES REDMOND AND JOSEPH HANNON

In 1954 the Supreme Court declared segregation in public education to be
unconstitutional. In 1967 James Redmond presented a plan which proposed the
first out-and-out integration program in Chicago school history. In 1977 the
Chicago Board of Education, under the leadership of Joseph Hannon, passed a
resolution designed to meet criteria which would establish requirements and
procedures for the elimination and prevention of racial segregation in the city's
public schools. By the end of 1979 Hannon was gone and desegregation had not
occurred.
Twenty-five years passed from the time Chief Justice Warren announced his
landmark decision until the time Superintendent Hannon announced his
resignation from the school system. Within that timespan, desegregation in public
education had been a primary topic of discussion. What had not been addressed
was that historically, being educated in segregated settings had been a way of life
for many black and white children in America and in Chicago. After the decree,

vi

pressure was put on school systems to desegregate as set forth by constitutional
law.

Although Redmond and Hannon inherited overriding problems, both presented
programs that they thought: (1) would address answers to desegregating
Chicago's schools; and (2) would be answers to the federal government's
mandates. One might wonder then if gains were made in eliminating racial
segregation in the public schools under the superintendencies of James Redmond
and Joseph Hannon. Looking back at past events might help the city's school
system avoid future mistakes.

vii

CHAP'IERI
BACKGROUND

Proloime
The year was 1954. Earl Warren was confirmed as Chief Justice on 1 March
and by 17 May he along with the eight remaining members of the U.S. Supreme
Court declared segregation in public education to be unconstitutional.1 It was a
deprivation of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America. In part the
amendment read: "Segregation of white and Negro children in the public schools
of a State solely on the basis of race denies to Negro children the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."2
It is quite likely that Warren's decision was affected by a recent experience his

chauffeur had had. Not long before the Court's decision was announced, Justice
Warren had decided to spend a few days visiting Civil War monuments in
Virginia. He went by automobile with a black chauffeur. At the end of the first
day, the Chief Justices's car pulled up at a hotel, where he had arranged to spend

1

Richard Kluger, Simple Justice (New York: Random House, Inc.,1977), 708.

2

Brown

et. al. v, Board of Education of Topeka et, al. 347 U.S. 483. (1954).
1

2

the night. When the Chief Justice came out of his hotel the next morning to
resume his tour, he soon figured out that the chauffeur had spent the night in the
car. He asked the black man why. "Well, Mr. Chief Justice," the chauffeur began,
"I just couldn't find a place--couldn't find a place to...." Warren was stricken
by his own thoughtlessness in bringing his employee to a town where lodgings
were not available to the man solely because of his color. "I was embarrassed, I
was ashamed," he recalled. "We turned back immediately...."3 The more
Warren pondered the question, the more he had come to the conclusion that the
doctrine of separate-but-equal rested upon the concept of the inferiority of the
colored race. Although he was concerned about the necessity of overruling earlier
decisions and lines of reasoning, he had decided that segregation of Black
schoolchildren had to be ended.4 He had come to the conclusion that the schoolsegregation laws were nothing but black codes, and if he were to uphold them
now he would be affirming that for some reason Blacks were inferior to all other
human beings.5

3

Kluger, 699.

4

Kluger, 679.

5

Kluger, 674.

3

Brown vs, Board of Education and Other Cases Thr0111~h 1975
Prior to 1954, young black schoolage children were seeking the aid of the courts
in obtaining admission to the public schools of their communities on a
nonsegregated basis. They had been denied admission to schools attended by
white children under laws permitting segregation according to race. Statutes
requiring the maintenance of separate schools for whites and blacks were in force
in eighteen states and the District of Columbia.6 Such statutes were previously
thought to be constitutional under the theory that separate facilities were
permissible if they were equal. In 1896, Homer Plessy, a Negro was not allowed
to ride in the car of a train designated "for whites only." Plessy sued the courts in
1896 and lost because the courts upheld that separate car facilities for Negroes
were equal to those for whites. 7 From 1896 to 1954, a series of court cases
upheld the separate but equal doctrine until under Warren's direction the 1954
Supreme Court decided that "separate but equal" did not apply to education.
The 1954 case concerned Linda Brown of Topeka, Kansas, an eight-year-old
black child, who lived in an integrated neighborhood where she played with white
children after school and on weekends. During the week, she was bused away
from the school nearest to her home. That school was for white children only.

6

"Supreme Court Equity Discretion: The Decrees in the Segregation Cases,"
Yale Law Journal, 64: (1954-55), 124-136.
7

J. Harvie Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1979), 40.

4
Because Linda had to travel a good distance from her neighborhood surroundings
to the school for black children, her father, Oliver Brown, brought suit against the
Board of Education on behalf of elementary black children. The result of Mr.
Brown's suit was in his favor. The federal district Kansas court found that even
though segregation had a detrimental effect on black children, it denied relief on
the ground that both black and white schools were equal in many respects. 8
Brown et. al. versus Topeka was the landmark case challenging the
constitutionality of segregation in public education. However, it represented four
other companion cases that were listed in federal court records.
Because all five cases were arguing for equal educational relief based on the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, they were later
grouped under what was to become known as the Brown versus the Topeka Board
of Education landmark decision. The first one involved black children of high
school age residing in Prince Edward County, Virginia. Representatives for the
children brought action in the United States District Court for the Eastern

,

District of Virginia in 1950 to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state
constitution and statutory code which required the segregation of Negroes and
whites in public schools. 9 District court judges denied the request even though
they agreed the school for Blacks was inferior. The court ordered the Davis
County School board to "fix-up" and remove the inequities. Nevertheless, the

8

Brown

9Thid.

et. al. v, Board of Education of Topeka et. al. 347 U.S. 483_ (1954).

5
plaintiffs were denied admission to the white schools during the equalization
program.10
A second case saw parents of both elementary and high-school age children
bringing action against the Delaware Court in Gebhart versus Belton 1935. The
chancellor heard the case and ordered minority children to be immediately
admitted to all-white schools on the ground that the black schools were indeed
inferior. Unfortunately, due to public pressure, the chancellor modified his
decision. The defendants contended that the courts had made-a mistake in
ordering immediate admission of the minority plaintiffs.11 Black schoolchildren
of Clarendon County brought suit against the Eastern District of South Carolina
in 1942 and became the third case under the Brown case. 12 A three-judge
District Court denied the requested relief. Even though the court found the black
schools to be inferior to the white schools, the court sustained the validity of the
contested provisions and denied the plaintiffs in the Briggs versus Elliott case
admission to the white schools.
A companion case to the previous ones was Bolling versus Sharpe heard in the

District of Columbia in 1954. Black children were denied admission to a public
school attended by white children solely on the basis of their race. The district
court heard the complaint and dismissed it because the plaintiffs had based their

1

°Ibid.

11

Brown et. al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et. al. 347 U.S. 483. (1954).

12

Kluger, 783

6

argument on denial of due process under the Fifth Amendment. (The courts
argued that the Fifth Amendment did not contain an equal protection clause as
did the Fourteenth Amendment.) The court did recognize however, that
discrimination was unjustifiable.131n fact, Chief Justice Warren continued:
"Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. We have now announced
that such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws."14 The
Court did not decide just how the illegal segregation should be eliminated but
placed the case on the docket for further reargument which occurred in 1955.15
Again, Chief Justice Warren delivered the judgments which stated that racial
discrimination in public education was unconstitutional. Succinctly put, the courts
had formed the law; now it was up to the school authorities to assess, clarify and
solve while fully implementing the law set forth by the Constitution. Naturally
problems were to arise from the change to a system of public education that was
to be freed of racial discrimination.
The courts had made a declaration, but would the action of school authorities
constitute good faith? The government suggested the case be given to the district
courts and instructed the defendants not to use race or color as a basis of
admission to their public schools. More specifically they suggested: "If the
defendants show that it is impracticable or inequitable to grant the plaintiffs the

13

Kluger, 786.

14

Brown v. Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

15

Ibid.

7

remedy of immediate admission to nonsegregated schools, the court shall order
the defendants to propose and, on approval by the court after a public hearing, to
put into effective operation a program for transition to a non-segregated school
system as expeditiously as circumstances permit."16
The federal courts often concluded that details of decrees were best left in the
hands of district court judges because they were closer to the facts of the case. In
addition, they felt the district court judges might spend more time hearing
evidence on the segregation decree. Thus, the Supreme Court adjured the lower
courts to "enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are
necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory
basis 'with all deliberate speed' the parties to these cases."17 Implementation of
the decrees was to begin immediately. Because it modified the 1954 Brown
decision, the decisions became known as Brown I and II respectively.
The National Context
After Brown I and II, the Supreme Court decided that the nation's schools must
integrate with "all deliberate speed." Many school systems responded by not
readily complying.
When a state is dissatisfied with a Supreme Court decision, to the point of
noncompliance, the state may assert: ( 1) that the decision violates the

16

"Supreme Court Equity Discretion", 135.

17

"Brown. v. Topeka, 294.

8

Constitution; or, (2) that it denies federal judges review over state action. Also,
the state may adopt a legislative plan designed to avoid or delay the full impact of
the Court's decision. 18 Since the ''with all deliberate speed"19 phrase was vague
and left open to question, some states employed delaying tactics such as
noncompliance. The Supreme Court justices seemed aware that this might
happen, but the Court had ruled. Although Chief Justice Warren stated: "such
segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws,"20 he recognized that
the Court's decision would have widespread repercussions varying in intensity
from state to state. Thus, he knew that moving for compliance would have to be
approached in as tolerant and understanding a way as possible.21
Besides holding it unconstitutional for governmental authorities to use dual
public school systems as a means of segregating students by race, the Supreme
Court also held it unconstitutional for governmental authorities to: (1) maintain
racially segregated, so-called "private" schools; (2) close public schools rather than

18

Robert B. McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed: A Study of School
Desegregation", New York University Law Review 31, (1956), 1039.
19

A subtle but useful phrase became useful in solving the dilemma of how to spur
the desegregation process without fixing a firm timetable for its completion. The
phrase ''with deliberate speed" had been used by Justice Frankfurter in the mid 1940s
and had been used again in early 1954. Justice Frankfurter had borrowed it from
Oliver Wendell Holmes who had used it in writing a Court's opinion in a 1918 case.
Still others say the term originated from a nineteenth century poet, Francis
Thompson. (Richard Kluger, Simple Justice, 1977).
~rnst Borinski, "A Legal and Sociological Analysis of the Integration Decrees
of 31 May 1955," University of Pittsbur2h Law Review 16 (1955), 329.
21

Kluger, 680.

9

desegregate dual public school systems; (3) cause public school teachers and other
educational employees to be racially segregated.22 For example,in Griffin
versus County School Board (1964) Virginia, the public schools were closed
although public schools in all other counties of the state remained open, and the
"private" schools which took the place of the closed public schools were supported
by state and county funds. The reason which county officials gave for closing the
schools was that they sought to avoid the admission of white and black children to
all the schools of the county without regard to race or color. The court noted that
the record in the case could not be clearer concerning the fact that the county's
public schools were closed to black children and "private" schools operated in
their place with state and county assistance. The sole reason was to insure that
white and Negro children would not, under any circumstances, go to the same
school."23 Because grounds of race and opposition to desegregation were
unconstitutional, the "private" school plan was created by Virginia county officials.
Thus they perpetuated racial segregation by closing public schools and operating
only segregated schools supported directly or indirectly by state and/or county
funds. The plan worked to deny black students equal protection of the laws. 24
According to John W. Davis, an attorney, arguing for school desegregationsegregation cases: at the heart of all these cases was the diehard South's defense
22

Sheldon R. Shapiro, "Racial Discrimination in Education - Supreme Court
Cases", United States Supreme Court's Reports, Lawyer's Edition. 24, 2d, 765.
23
24

Shapiro, 773.

Ibid.

10
that prejudice had nothing to do with the practice of segregation; it was simply
something that served both races well.25 Brown I and II, however, shot holes in
this defense and gave the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) a new platform from which to call for equality.
Thurgood Marshall, lawyer for the NAACP, believed in the United States
and the Constitution, but he also believed that the whole system was tragically
flawed by the segregation laws. 26 Marshall, along with other NAACP lawyers,
had researched an historical account of the history of segregation in the wake of
the Compromise of 1877.27 The resulting law brief strongly stated that
Segregation was designed to insure inequality--to discriminate on account of
race and color--and the separate but equal doctrine accommodated the
Constitution to that purpose. Separate but equal is a legal fiction. There
never was and never will be any separate equality. Our Constitution cannot

25

Kluger, 673.

26

Kluger, 639.

27

Scholarly researchers said that the Compromise of 1877 handed control of the
Republican Party to those who believed that the protection and expansion of their
economic power could best be served by political conciliation of the southern
irreconcilables, rather than by unswerving insistence upon human equality and the
rights guaranteed by the postwar Amendments. Once the Redeemers of white
supremacy took over in the South, they brought massive peonage,
disenfranchisement, segregation, and terror to the colored masses, the brief argued,
and Plessy legitimized that caste system. Thus the Negro ''was effectively restored
to an inferior position through laws and through practices, now dignified as 'custom
and tradition."' (excerpt from Richard Kluger's Simple Justice, 646.)

11
be used to sustain ideologies and practices which we as a nation of people

abhor. 28
Once the Brown II case was decided, the nation of people turned their eyes
towards the White House to get a hint of its leader's opinion on the matter.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower was said to have favored prompt desegregation
of colleges and secondary schools. However, "he thought that in the primary
schools a more gradual approach would diminish the probability that severe and
very likely violent opposition would result in the event that little children were
forcibly intermingled". 29 His assistant added that "Eisenhower's advisors differed
among themselves and that the Department of Justice was more eager to promote
a definitive resolution of the matter than was the Executive". 30 The national
mood was somber because it was evident that any effort to integrate Southern
schools would lead to great strife and turmoil. Opponents from the state of
Florida cried that: "an immediate inrush of turbulent ideas might cause a tornado
which would devastate the entire school system." The Governor of Virginia
declared: "I shall use every legal means at my command to continue segregated
schools in my beloved state."31 Though reactions and opinions were wide and

28

Kluger, 646.

2

9Kluger, 651.

~id.
31

Kluger, 711.
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varied from coast to coast, a factor commonly agreed upon was that something
basic in American lives and values had been touched.32
The reaction from Chicago seemed to be of a more accepting nature as when
for example, black scholar, Allison Davis saw the decision as a triumph for the
entire nation. He said, ''when this decision is implemented, it will result in a
tremendous increase in the fund of ability and skill available to our country''.33
This is not surprising considering the fact that Chicago's history and its treatment
of Blacks was different from that of Virginia and the South. Instead of separate
but equal, it had neighborhood schools.
The Chica&o Context
The earliest account of public schooling in Chicago began with twelve children
in an integrated setting. There had been little schooling for the children of the
settlement before the sale of the land. In 1832 Richard Hamilton had donated a
twelve-foot-square log stable north of the river. Here a young Easterner named
John Watkins taught reading to four white and eight Indian children as they sat
on old boxes. There were also twenty children in a school at the little
Presbyterian church and a handful of boys at the Baptist church. 34 For the next
thirty-one years, little was written or known about black children attending
32

.Kluger, 709.

33

.Kluger, 714.

34

Mary J. Herric~ The Chica&o Schools: A Social and Political Histoiy, (Beverly
Hills/London: Sage Publications 1971.

13

Chicago's public schools. Finally, in 1863, a separate school for colored children
was opened in the Mission School building. It was not well suited to the wants of
the school because it was entirely destitute of yard room and in other respects was
very inconvenient. Attendance was irregular. The average attendance in 1864
was 55 and in 1865 was 102. The school was closed in April 1865.35
There is no information on what happened to the black children after the close
of the "colored school." However, it was speculated that the parents of black
children in the already established schools refused to obey the ordinance to send
their children to a separate school based on race and continued to send their
children to the schools in which they were already emolled.36 The ongoing
pressure of delegations of black citizens descending on the mayor and on the
board of education brought about the repeal of the so-called Black School Law of
1863. A separate evening school for blacks, however, was maintained between
1869 and 1870.37 Finally, in 1874, a new regulation was written into the

Municipal Code of Chicago which in theory abolished the segregation laws. In
part, it read:
All directors of school officers whose duty is now, or may be hereafter, to
provide in their respective jurisdictions schools for the education of all
children between the ages of 6 and 21 years are prohibited from excluding,

35

Chicago Board of Education Archives

36

Herrick, 53.

37

Ibid.

14
directly or indirectly, any such child from such on account of the color of such
child.38
A reaction to the regulation quickly set the tone which was to follow for many
years after. The following day an editorial in the Chica&o Tribune read in part:
The City School Board at its session last night decided to strike the word
white from the regulations of the city school and admit all children without
regard to color or previous condition, upon equality into the city schools.
There is some excitement about the matter, and the State Register in its issue
tonight denounces the action in unmeasured terms. It is probable that some
white children will be withdrawn by the overnight. 39
Segregation had now been declared unacceptable by the city's municipal code
but acceptance would have to come from within the school system. From the very
onset, "legalizing" integration in Chicago met with resistance that came from
groups small in number yet powerful in vocal opposition. Early accounts labeled
the public school system of Chicago as being racially polluted. According to
Roger Pulliam, black historian, legally segregating Blacks in Chicago's public
schools was a goal.40 But the wishes of a few could not alleviate the fact that
the black population was steadily and rapidly increasing.

38

Roger L. Pulliam, "Historical Review of Black Education: Chicago," Ne&ro
Educational Review. 29, 1, (January 1978): 24.

~lliam, 25.
40Jbid.
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Before the 1900s, the total black population of Chicago was less than 1 percent.
Approximately, fifteen years later, Chicago experienced a large influx of black
migrants from the south. By 1939, when the United States was about to enter a
world war, the black population had become an integral part of Chicago's
expanding labor force and the problems of black education had to be solved.41
The schools had become segregated and the black schools were inferior in
teaching, staffing, and facilities. 42
An analysis of the 1950 and 1960 censuses shows that the separation of the

races had become sharper than in the early 1940s in Chicago.43 During the
fifties, large numbers of neighborhood blocks changed from almost completely
white to virtually all black. A Chicago Urban League Research Report revealed
that in 1950, the North Lawndale area had a black population of 13 percent. By
1960, that same area had a black population of 90 percent.44 However,
population increase was not to blame for the virtually segregated population of
North Lawndale. Thousands of families had to be relocated as a result of urban
renewal, expressway construction, and slum clearance.45 A high percentage of
those persons relocated were blacks but a segregated housing pattern had now

41

Pulliam, 26.

42

Ibid.

43

Pulliam, 27.

44

Ibid.

45

Ibid.
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been established. Because Chicago's public schools had grown on the basis of the
neighborhood school, the schools had also become segregated. Official restrictive
housing covenants and neighborhood school policies established to be consistent
with them worked to contain blacks and other minorities in specified areas of the
city. By 1956, 91 percent of the elementary schools and 71 percent of the high
schools had student enrollments representative of a single race.46 Segregation
was disturbing but it seemed to be an accepted fact that Chicago had a higher
degree of residential black segregation than any other large northern city.47
Finally, in the 1960s, national attention was focused on the city's public school
system.48 Robert J. Havighurst, an educator at the University of Chicago, was
asked by the school board to undertake a major survey of Chicago schools. When
completed, the survey not only stressed the need for integrating Chicago schools
but further recommended that its administrative apparatus, headed by Dr.
Benjamin Willis, be decentralized.49
Dr. Willis did much to correct and upgrade the educational system.50
Welcomed in 1953 to succeed Dr. Herold Hunt, Willis was credited with working

46

Student Deseifeiation Plan for the Chica&o Public Schools:
Deseifeiation Review, 1982-83.

Annual

47

Herrick, 311.

48

Pulliam, 28.

4

9Feterson, Paul. School Politics, Chicaio Style., Chicago, University of Chicago
Press, 1976, 32.
50

Cynthia Wnek, "Big Ben, the Builder" (Ph. D. Dissertation, Loyola- University
of Chicago, 1988).

17
out a new salary schedule for teachers, reducing the average elementary class size,
overhauling the high school curriculum and offering vocational education in some
of the schools. In addition, new educational methods were introduced, funds were
allocated for special programs and school buildings were upgraded, modernized or
built.51

Nevertheless, it became evident that in black neighborhoods, the

superintendent was operating a proportionately high number of mobile classrooms
known notoriously as "Willis Wagons."52
Many Black leaders, civil rights groups and integration activists, were positive
that this policy and the resulting constructions were quite simply a way of
making sure that Black populations were kept contained within certain areas
and neighborhoods and not allowed to spread to all-White areas and
neighborhoods of the city.53
Charges that Willis's plans for using federal money were not directed at schools
having high concentrations of children from low-income underprivileged families
resulted in an investigation.54 The government withheld the funds from the City
of Chicago pending the hearing on the complaints to the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW) on segregation in the Chicago schools. The
hearing resulted in a suit brought by the Coordinating Council of Community
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Organization (CCCO) in 1965. In part, it read: In 1964-65, with the addition of
10 new elementary schools and two new secondary schools accommodating an
increase of 642 white and 264 other pupils, segregation in the Chicago schools was
shown to have increased. Absolutely segregated elementary schools now
constituted 82.3% of the total, and in both categories, segregated schools now
constituted 74.4% of the total.55
In 1963, the Chicago Board of Education had also created an advisory panel of
five members to study the problem of segregation in the public schools. The
panel was headed by Phillip Hauser, a demographer at the University of Chicago.
The report and its findings were later to become known as The Hauser Report.
The panel was assigned the following task:
to analyze and study the school system in particular regard to schools
attended entirely or predominantly by Negroes, define any problems that
result therefrom, and formulate and report to the Board as soon as may be
conveniently possible, a plan by which any educational, psychological, and
emotional problems or inequities in the school system that prevail may best
be eliminated.56
The panel met together for a total of twenty-four days.

At the very onset, the

group established that de facto segregation (actual segregation due to living
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patterns) was not unique to Chicago. It went on to reveal that de facto
segregation was not the result of the intent or design of the Board of Education of
Chicago, nor of boards of education in most other metropolitan areas. It was a
by-product of segregated patterns of settlement and housing.57 Therefore, as a
result of residential concentration, the black population, like white immigrants
before them, found their children attending de facto segregated schools.58 While
the Hauser Report revealed that many white immigrants found their children
attending de facto segregated schools, there were important differences that
seemingly "punished" black child~n based solely on skin color.
The Negro, unlike the white immigrant, was and is an American citizen; the
Negro remains visible and therefore identifiable, even after long residence in
the City; in addition to the handicaps of being a newcomer, the Negro carries
the added burdens of his heritage of slavery, the destruction of his African
culture, underprivileged rearing, denigration, and widespread racial prejudice.
In consequence, although they have made considerable progress in Chicago as
measured by higher levels of education, occupation, and income, Negroes
have not been as free as their white immigrant predecessors to break out of
segregated settlement areas and to achieve rapid economic and social
advance.59
In the early 1960s double shift schedules forced classrooms in black schools to
be overcrowded while under-utilized space remained in white schools. Instead of
pursuing a policy of pupil integration, the board undertook a crash program to
increase the number of classrooms in black neighborhoods. Elementary school
building schedules were accelerated, mobile units were purchased, and vacated
57
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commercial facilities were converted into schools(i() Through all of this activity,
the basic problem still existed: segregated schools were more widespread in the
City of Chicago than ever before.
These conditions did not go unnoticed, however.
Charles Armstrong a Chicago representative to the Illinois General Assembly, had
long realized that the city's efforts to desegregate its schools were futile. Finally,
in 1963, he successfully introduced and the assembly passed House Bill 113 which
made critical changes in the School Code of Illinois. In part, it read:
In erecting, purchasing, or otherwise acquiring buildings for school purposes,
the Board shall not do so in such a manner as to promote segregation or
separation of children in public schools because of color, race, or nationality.
As soon as practicable, and from time to time thereafter, the Board shall
change or revise existing (attendance) units or create new units in a manner
which will take into consideration the prevention of segregation, and the
elimination of separation of children in the public schools because of color,
race, or nationality. All records pertaining to the creation of attendance units
shall be open to the public.61
Enacting the Armstrong Law into the School Code did not necessarily mean
that it would be put into practice. At its regular meeting held on 10 July 1963, the
board of education approved the superintendent's recommended high school
attendance area boundary revisions for the fall term of school without adhering to
the previous agreement of keeping the public informed of revision changes. These
boundaries maintained segregated schools. Young civil rights leaders were so
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incensed by the board's attitude that a group of them staged a sit-in. Many were
evicted, many arrested, and many lost control, but a concession was won from
board President Roddewig who agreed to a formal meeting to listen to their
demands. 62
Beginning in May of 1966, Chicago newspapers began discussing the picking of
a successor to Willis. Many organizations became a part of the "fixing of the
criteria" for the selection of the next superintendent. A newspaper article stated
that forty-eight business and industrial leaders in Chicago urged the school board
to pick a Willis successor promptly.... Many speculated about James
Redmond's appointment to the job. Editorials put a lot of emphasis on the fact
that Redmond was a public relations expert and stated that: "some think it is
more important for the superintendent to be a public relations expert that a gifted
educator. Certainly a superintendent needs the patience to suffer fools gladly,
along with the courage to oppose them when he thinks they are wrong."63
Benjamin Willis, school superintendent, resigned 31 August 1966.
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CHAPTER IT
JAMES REDMOND AND CHANGE
James F. Redmond was appointed General Superintendent of Schools for the
city of Chicago 25 May 1966 and he was "exceedingly pleased" to learn he had
been selected to succeed Benjamin C. Willis. 1 Dr. Redmond's salary was an
impressive $32,500, and he had signed a five-year contract. At age fifty he
exhibited a friendly, calm and deliberative manner and characterized himself as
more of a liberal in education ''but with some old-fogy [sic] ideas like loyalty,
commitment to the profession and a real faith in the value and power of public
schools."2 He said he thought one of the major things he had done in Syosset,
New York was to institute an experimental program under which children could
voluntarily go eleven months of the year and complete six years of junior and
senior high school work in five. He viewed with pride that staff reduction
turnover was only about 10 percent.

1
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Prior EXl)Crience
Dr. Redmond was a product of Kansas City schools, and his first teaching
experience was there as well. When Herold C. Hunt was Kansas City school
superintendent, Redmond was his assistant from 1940 to 1946.3 After Hunt
became Chicago school superintendent in 1947, he brought Redmond in as his
assistant and trouble-shooter. 4 In 1950, Redmond began handling purchasing for
the schools and in that capacity became involved in several controversies. He
recommended awarding a fuel oil contract to a firm that was later discovered to
be controlled by relatives of a board member. A lower bid had been rejected as
not meeting specifications, although the fuel oil supplied by the favored firm did
not meet specifications either.5
Another controversy involved excessive charges for hauling federally donated
foods. Redmond had signed the report authorizing the arrangement. He later
testified to a county grand jury that he was not aware of the exhorbitant fees. 6 In
spite of the controversies, Dr. Redmond was the man thought most likely to
succeed Herold Hunt when he left as superintendent in 1953. However, a month
before Hunt announced his resignation, Redmond had committed himself to
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become superintendent of schools in New Orleans, Louisiana where he assumed
the post 1 June 1953.7 A month later, when Chicago school board members
began to search for a successor to Hunt, Redmond was sought to fill the post. He
told the board that he could not ask New Orleans to release him from his
contract. He did not realize at the time that he would have the opportunity years
later.8
The 1954 Supreme court decision on school desegregation had a resounding
effect on Redmond's career, but not until 1960. "A federal court order directed
New Orleans schools to intergrate [sic] and Redmond attempted to enforce the
order."9 Governor of Louisiana, Jimmie H. Davis, and the state legislature
attempted to take over operation of New Orleans schools from Redmond.
Governor Davis seized administration of the schools, but a federal court returned
control to Redmond and the New Orleans board of education.
Efforts to integrate white schools by enrolling five Negro girls were scheduled
for 15 November 1960. But the state legislature rammed thru new resolutions
giving the legislature control over New Orleans schools and firing Redmond.
Hours later, a federal judge issued a restraining order preventing any state
interference with the New Orleans school system and integration. 10
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As scheduled, five black girls entered the first grade in two formerly all-white

schools. A week later, a homemade bomb exploded in a parking lot space
reserved for Redmond. 11 In addition, the legislature withheld pay for Redmond
and New Orleans teachers. Funds for the school system were held, and bills
incurred were not paid. Banks were hesitant to issue loans, and Redmond was
fired by the state legislature seven times. However, the firings were ruled invalid
each time by a federal District court. Finally, in 1961, James Redmond left New
Orleans to become eastern director of school administration services for Booz,
Allen, and Hamilton, a nation-wide management consultant firm in New York
City. 12 Then in 1963, Redmond became school superintendent in Syosset, New
York.
Takini: the Helm in Chicai:o
James F. Redmond was a "new breed" of school superintendent. No devices
could be tried by segregationists in Chicago which would be new to him. Perhaps
two of his greatest assets for Chicago schools were a quiet dignity with which he
habitually met differences of opinion and a habit of emphasizing issues and goals
rather than his own personal importance.13
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When he arrived in October 1966, Superintendent Redmond found many things
waiting to be done for which he had no opportunity to set a time-table.14 He
was criticized because he kept most of the administrative staff and he retained
spokesmen who had been accused of racist and at times, hostile attitudes. 15
Earlier in the year when the school board was voting for Redmond's
appointment as superintendent, little did Thomas J. Murray, Board VicePresident, realize how prophetic his words were when he said: "I cast my vote for
Dr. Redmond and in doing so fervently pray that he will do half as well as his
predecessor. If he can accomplish that in the troublesome times that lie ahead,
he will be a great Superintendent of Schools."16 'And troublesome times
followed. The election which chose the Chicago Teachers Union as bargaining
agent in June 1966, required the immediate negotiation of a contract. Business
and industrial leaders needed to be heard. A tax referendum had been
authorized by the legislature in 1961 but had never been put on the ballot. The
reactions of leaders in the black community were cautious. The Coordinating
Council of Community Organizations and the Chicago Congress of Racial
Equality showed continued suspicion of Dr. Redmond's motives and hostility
toward his plans.17 However, "Gentleman Jim" as he was affectionately called,
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set about deepening and widening channels of communication with business and
industrial leaders, with the board of education, with the legislature and with as
many elements in the city at large as he could reach. 18 He offered to work with
the board committee in the teacher negotiations and spent many days doing so.
Within his first month in the city he explained the urgency of the schools'
financial situation to the fiscally cautious Civic Federation--and won its approval
of a tax referendum for $25 million for buildings, to be voted in the upcoming
November elections. 19 Although Chicago seemed willing to accept Redmond, he
was still facing a myriad of problems.
At the end of the superintendent's first year he asked the board to authorize a
series of studies on which recommendations for a building program could be
constructed to achieve social and educational goals necessary for the welfare of
the city. His first study, Desi~ for the Future: A Recommended Loni: Ran~e
Educational Plan for Chicai:o, 1967-1971. received criticism. It was said to be
too vague and based on past planning.20 The second study~ Or~anization Survey:
Board of Education of the City of Chicai:o, was presented in May 1967 by a
management firm employed by the board. The report recommended specific
changes in board procedure.
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Toe Board should no longer spend at least eighty percent of its time
reviewing detailed administrative and houskeeping [sic] items for which its
members had no special competence, and should be free to deliberate on
major issues of policy, to evaluate alternate courses of action, and to be
responsive to the educational needs of the city. It stated that these were the
reasons for the Board's existence and the areas in which it could be effective.
Board members were urged to seek staff assistance in analyzing reports and
doing independent research. The general superintendent should have enough
additional assistance in the task of coordinating divisions of the huge school
organization.... More areas of decision-making and administrative
responsibility should be delegated to area and district superintendents . . . to
tailor a school's services to the needs of a particular group of students at the
local level, and to work with parents and community leaders in doing so.
Services such as curriculum planning should be distributed among the
districts.... A human relations department should be included at the top
administrative level. The top administrative staff should be able to operate as
a team so that the general superintendent might be relieved to work closer
with the Board and to handle educational matters outside the school system.
February 1968, the board of education voted to accept these
recommendations and to use them as a basis for streamlining its activities.21
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However, there was still a very serious problem.
Chicago schools were segregated. Only 28 percent of its white students were in
schools more than 5 percent black and only 4.7 percent of its black students were
in predominantly (more than 50 percent) white schools. 22 Many felt that
Chicago had failed in integrating its public schools. Therefore, many felt that
constitutional law was being violated, and Chicagoans were waiting to see what
James Redmond would do.
In January 1967, the Chicago public schools received from the United States
Office of Education for Civil Rights a statement of findings and recommendations
concerning the schools. The report, entitled Report on Office of Education
Analysis of Certain Aspects of Chicago Public Schools under Title VI of the Civil
Ri~ts Act of 1964, highlighted four areas of special concern: Faculty Assignment
Patterns, Boundaries and Student Assignment Policies, the Apprenticeship
Training Program, and Open Enrollment for Vocational and Trade Schools.23
Dr. Redmond replied with a proposal requesting a planning grant from the U.S.
Office of Education under Section 405 (a) (2) of Title IV of Public Law 88-352.
The purpose would be to fund the employment of specialists to advise the staff
and to develop feasible plans for the solution of the following problems: (1)
Apprenticeship Training Programs; (2) Open Enrollment for Vocational and
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Trade Schools; (3) Boundaries and Student Assignment Policies; and (4) Faculty
Assignment Patterns.24
The grant was approved by the United States Office of Education, and it
provided for the employment of specialists to assist the staff in seeking solutions
to the problems.25 In brief, it called for a number of desegregation proposals.
Dr. Redmond stipulated the following recommendations:
I. Apprenticeship Training Programs
A

Cooperate with the U.S. Office of Education and the U.S.
Department of Labor in a review of the Mayor's program to
increase enrollment of students from Negro and other minority
groups.

B. Develop plans for working on a continuing basis with apprenticeship
councils to assist in increasing minority representation in
apprenticeship programs and to develop public confidence in the
procedures of the councils.
C. Develop a program to more effectively inform students from minority

groups about apprenticeship opportunities and to plan additional
programs to prepare such students to achieve eligibility.
II. Open Enrollment for Vocational and Trade Schools
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A

Arrange conferences with the U.S. Office of Education to explore
additional procedures to implement the open enrollment policy now
in effect in Vocational and Trade Schools in order to increase
integration in these schools.

B. Investigate opportunities for extension of career development
programs.

m. Boundaries and student Assignment Policies
A Retain independent and objective specialists to work with the staff.
B. Review attendance boundaries and assignment policies of students.
C. Determine the feasibility of various actions within the power of the
Board of Education to reduce segregation.
IV. Faculty Assignment Patterns
A Retain personnel administration experts as consultants.
B. Involve representatives of teacher organizations.
C. Review teacher personnel assignment procedures to plan for
increased integration of faculties.
D. Develop feasible plans to equalize the distribution of experienced
teachers to the greatest possible degree.
E. Identify characteristics and conditions of schools which distinguish
desirable and less desirable schools as seen by teachers.26
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It was made clear that the report was an answer to the questions raised by
the Office of Education earlier and that its preparation had been financed by a
planning grant from that office. 27 Planning began 1 April 1967, and action was
initiated immediately. Experts from ten universities, from the school staffs of
three other large cities, from several national and local organizations, including
the Chicago Urgan League, representatives of Chicago teacher organizations, and
of the Chicago school administrative staff and also teachers below the
administrative level served as consultants in drawing up its recommendations. 28
In direct response to the report, the team stated the following basic assumption:
Particularly are we concerned about racial and economic deprivation in our
midst. ... When a condition so pervasive in our city bears in upon the
schools, the schools can not hope to solve the problem except in commitment
and action shared by the community--a genuine shared commitment with all
groups who can make common cause with the Board of Education for quality
education for all. We see an obligation to undertake a comprehensive
educational program aimed at reversing a pervasive social condition that has
become deeply rooted in our society ... and seek educational pathways to a
better society. 29
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After a period of restudying ongoing procedures, making plans for feasible
changes and developing new techniques to solve the problems indicated, the team
drew up a plan. On 23 August 1967, Dr. Redmond presented the plan entitled:
Increasin& Deseil'e&ation of Faculties, Students,

and Vocational Education

Proi{anis, It was later to become known as the Redmond Report. In brief, the
plan called for a number of desegregation proposals which made front page
headlines that same evening:
At a special session of the Board of Education, Redmond proposed the first
out-and-out integration program in Chicago school history. It would include
dispersion of limited numbers of Negro pupils into outlying all-white schools.
They would be moved from integrated schools whose neighborhoods are
becoming predominantly Negro, such as those in South Shore and Austin.30
First reactions were from qualified acceptance to outright hostility. Early
predictions were that schools would open amid the same climate of argument and
tension that had marked school openings in previous years.31 Edwin C. Berry,
executive director of the Chicago Urban League, said that the plan was a good
first step but he was not endorsing the quota system. He added, "As a beginning
to gain integration in the schools, this is all right to start with. In order to
implement the educational system and get better education for our· kids, I have to
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go along with the plan at this point."32 Meyer Weinberg, history professor at
Wright Junior College and editor of Inteuated Education magazine stated: "Its
tone is much more constructive than anything that came out from the office under
(Willis). My question is will intentions be carried out?"33
A final reaction from S. Thomas Sutton, an Elmhurst, Illinois attorney who
headed "Operation Crescent" an organization opposed to black residential moveins and school integration, was that the plan might force his group to "press
Operation Withdrawal." He predicted that whites would move enmasse from the
city and he urged Redmond to build more schools in the black and white
communities where the students lived. 34 Even though Dr. Redmond's plan was
labeled as racist and discriminatory by many blacks, his long-term goal intentions
were to anchor whites that resided in the city. He hoped to achieve and maintain
stable racial attendance proportions in changing fringe areas.35 While
Chicagoans were trying to absorb the news of this revolutionary plan, board
members were meeting with Redmond to adopt it.
Mrs. Louis A. Malis moved for adoption of the report. She further moved that
the general superintendent of schools be instructed to forward a copy of it to the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare. All votes were yeas with the
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exception of a pass vote by Mr. Edward S. Scheffler. Mr. Scheffler's reservations
lay in the fact that some of the suggestions would require judicial interpretation
and costs had not been calculated. 36 He went on to state:
At present in our large cities in the field of school integration many
impractical promises have been made and the fulfillment of those promises
have been discouraging. The Chicago Board of Education should not be
compelled to make commitments as suggested in the report until such a time
as we have good reason to believe that we can fulfill them. For that reason, I
pass.37
Still other board members had misgivings. Mrs. Wendell E. Green's concern
was with costs for implementation, but she countered with "We are being asked to
adopt a statement of philosophy, a statement of policy . I would urge that we do
not delay because the situation in the City of Chicago is urgent. "38 Even though
board member, Mrs. W. Lydon Wild had voted "yea," she wanted the record to
show that accepting the plan in principle did not mean it should be implemented
immediately since there were no cost projections and no funds were available.39
In connection with the adoption of the report, Board President Frank M. Whiston
stated:
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I think ... that we are talking about tremendous sums of money. We are
broke now. We don't know where we're going to get money, but we are
going ahead with a program and I think we're beginning to invite some
criticism. If it gets to a point where we cannot get enough moeny to put this
program well on its way--for example, if the program is going to cost $40
million or $20 million or whatever it may be, and we only get $5 million from
someone, I wonder where we should ·start the program. At that point I want
to continue to be free to express myself and while I'm voting aye, I do it with
the provisions that I can change as we go along.40
In keeping with a new spirit of racial comity that had arisen since Willis's
departure, the school board unanimously approved "in principle" this document
which rapidly became known as the Redmond Report, 41

Chicago's American newspaper had already hinted that educational park
complexes and magnet schools were outlined in the report as ways of
desegregating for the future, but the next morning, The Chicago Tribune printed
highlights of Redmond's broad program for the Chicago schools:
Educational parks would be developed during the next 30 years with
each serving up to 20,000 pupils on eight to ten peninsulas to be created
along the lakefront. Another 15 to 20 similar educational centers would be
built largely around the rim of the city. Each center would include
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elementary, high and specialized schools. These would permit eventual
closing of some 300 neighborhood schools.
Magnet schools offering "exemplary programs in specialized fields" in
attractive nonresidential locations such as parks and white residential areas
near suburbs would be established. The schools would be open to all students
in the city with transportation provided if required.
Instruction would be provided on those school buses which would carry
pupils from their home districts to other schools to extend integration. Pupils
would attend schools primarily in "areas least threatened by residential
change." Percentage limits on minority attendance of integrated schools
would be established.
A quota system, incentives and rules to bring a proportionate share of
the best qualified and most experienced teachers to inner-city schools would
be established. Instructional groups would be headed by experienced teachers
and include less-experienced teachers, aides, interns and practice teachers.
Integration of teaching personnel would be encouraged.
Parking lots would be built at inner-city schools for the protection of
teachers. School buses would carry groups of teachers to and from inner-city
schools if necessary.
Vocational education programs would be improved and expanded with
campaigns conducted to increase attendance.

38
A metropolitan area educational council would be created to develop
pupil and teacher exchange programs within the city and between Chicago
and predominantly white suburbs.
City officials would act to bring about city-wide integrated housing in
order to fully integrate schools.
Money required for the long-range plan would come from the federal
government.42
Obviously, total desegregation would not come about quickly, but Redmond had
finally initiated policies moving towards it, and Chicagoans had taken notice.
Board of education member Thomas J. Murray was heard to comment on several
of the bolder proposals for increasing Chicago school integration. He said: ''The
recommendations are proper and right and should be implemented as soon as
possible.'t43 But little did anyone realize just how complicated and interwoven
Redmond's solution to desegregation would become.
Less than a month after his report made headlines, James Redmond was again
front page news because he moved to implement a decentralization policy which
divided the school system into three parts. An area associate superintendent
would be named to administer each segment. The new districts, with
headquarters to be located near the center of each of their areas would mark the
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first major administrative reorganization of the schools in a long time. (See map
on following page).
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The purpose of the three smaller districts would be to ''bring the responsibility for
decisionmaking closer to the local school.'144 Each man would have full
administrative authority over what would amount to his own school system except
that technical assistance and major policy decisions would come from the central
office. Named to the posts were: Dr. Curtis C. Melnick, in charge of Area A on
the South Side; Julien D. Drayton, administrator of Area Bon the West Side; and
Dr. George W. Connelly, head of Area Con the North Side.45 After the
appointments were confirmed, all three men expressed strong conviction that
more decisions should be made at the local level and that relations with the
communities should be improved. Redmond said the areas were divided to
provide a balanced work load in each of the districts with approximately the same
number of students. Even though Area A would be comprised of 73 percent
black students, Area B 60 percent black students and Area C 25 percent black
students, Chicagoans seemed to accept Redmond's decentralization program
because civil rights groups, community organizations and city agencies had been
consulted before Redmond had made his final decision.
Redmond had finally won little but significant approval in his efforts to
desegregate the public schools.46
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On 28 December 1967, the school board voted eight to two in favor of plans to
bus some five thousand students in February of 1968 in an effort to stabilize racial
integration in the Austin and South Shore communities.47 The proposal would
be the first major implementation of the Redmond .flim for integrating and
upgrading the public schools.48 The busing proposal would involve the
transportation of less than 1 percent of the total student body for the next
semester with a slight increase for the fall semester. No school involved in the
program would be less than 65 percent white in enrollment and newly integrated
schools would not be less than 85 percent white. On 29 December, opposition
was voiced.
Reactive and Proactive Forces are Heard
Thirty-three of 47 speakers at the first citywide hearing on the board's busing
plan opposed busing. Thirteen favored busing and the Chicago Region of the
Illinois PTA congress favored more integration but took no stand on busing.
Thirty of the opponents represented community groups and PTA's from all-white
areas. Even though none of the communities represented were directly affected
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by Redmond's immediate busing proposals, opponents regarded the busing plans

as the beginning of the end of the neighborhood school concept. Others cited the
threat of air pollution and congested traffic from the use of buses. Four
denounced busing as a Communist plot.49 An anti-busing PTA member of one
public grade school summed it up poetically:
We feel it is dangerous, as well
as quite cruel
To send kids out of their neighborhood school.
Some think we oppose busing
'cause these kids are not white.
But wouldn't busing then, increase the suburban flight.
So we ask, and we beg, and we
plead heart in hand
We don't live in Russia, give
us back our free land.
A Rogers Park community leader found himself, not surprisingly, in the minority
when he invited the board of education to bus black children to unused
classrooms in the all-white North Side area. When he repeated his group's
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support of the plan and invited "the admission of all children to schools in our
area," there were shouts of: "We hope you get 'em all.'60
While some opponents of busing took a light-hearted "it's inevitable" approach,
others were seriously dead-set against it. A parent on the northwest side of
Chicago sent a letter to board member, Cyrus H. Adams III, dated 26 February

1968, the day of the first citywide hearing. In part, it read:
I am a mother of seven children, all going to school. ... we are supporting all
of their education with real estate taxes and tuition. Three of these children
use public transportation every day at our own expense. No colored parents
have agreed to pay $150,000.00 to transport anybody else's children and I
could imagine the thought that would come to their minds if they were asked
to do so. They would say we were crazy. Well that is exactly what I think of
Mr. Redmond's plan.... No matter how bad the weather or how far these
children live they have to walk home for lunch. Now you want us to approve
the right for these colored children to have lunchroom facilities at this school.
Where do you see equal rights in this situation.... you want the negroes to
have the right to chose [sic] their neighbors but not the whites, who pay most
of the tax dollar in Chicago. Our forefathers had to work hard when they
came to this country. The negroes have jobs handed to them and they loaf on
the job, stay home from work, rob and steal, because they know they have
Civil Rights groups protecting them charging "Discrimination." ... We are
called hysterical and panicky. This is correct.51

If black support of the Redmond Plan was at first half-hearted, the white
hostility to busing subsequently provoked sturdier black support.52 Mr. Edwin
Berry, executive director of the Urban League, observed that "anyone who can
stand against such a little busing plan as this must be in favor of reinstating
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slavery."53 After the board finally rejected compulsory busing, Mr. Warren
Bacon, the black community's leading representative on the school board alleged
that it had "retreated in the face of bigoted opposition."54
At a special meeting 4 March 1968, the school board changed one of the busing
plans from compulsory to voluntary. Even though parents of black children were
reluctant to send their children into neighborhoods where there was talk of
violence, voluntary transfers increased gradually.55 But there were those who
opposed voluntary busing. The education committee of the Citizens' Council at a
northside high school sent a letter stating their opposition because they felt it was
too heavy a responsibility for the parents themselves; they felt the voluntary basis
indicated less than full support from the Board of Education and they felt that
voluntary busing would make the children and parents more susceptible to
intimidation and pressure.56 The group went on to say: "We know the difficulty
of proceeding with the business of education in overcrowded class rooms. Since
no miracle is forthcoming to provide an adequate number of new class rooms in
the near future, it is a waste of tax dollars to allow vacancies to continue."57
Realizing that busing was a vital part of the magnet school concept, the council
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did not want to jeopardize proposals for quality integrated education by leaving
the decision to bus or not to bus up to the parents. The council commended Dr.
Redmond and his staff for proposing solutions to problems that had been facing
Chicagoans for year.
A northside ministers association also voiced support for the busing plan when,
in part, they wrote: ''we realize that the welfare of Northwest Chicago, both now
and even more so in the future, is bound up with the welfare of the rest of
Chicago. Likewise we believe that it is good economy and a good educational
procedure to relieve the overcrowding in some schools and to make use of vacant
seats in other schools.'68 The ministers favored the busing proposal to allow
children from the Austin area to go to receiving schools in Northwest Chicago.
The ministers hoped that by showing good will to all children, others would be
encouraged to follow suit. Cyrus Adams received yet another letter. The
endorsement was from a family of six "in favor of the plan for the betterment of
education for all children in Chicago.''59 Even though the northside interest
groups were supportive through letters and phone calls, southside groups were just
as vocal.
The Women's Board of the Chicago Urban League voiced concern due to harsh
"resistance being offered to this plan, for it seems clear that much of the protest is
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really against even the merest bit of integration rather than against busing per
se.'tliO They encouraged full implementation without further delay. A Hyde Park
resident was more adamant in his letter to Mr. Adams in reference to the board's
vote change from compulsory to voluntary busing when he wrote: "On Ash
Wednesday you have helped give Chicagoans another great sin to repent of."
While many private and public interest groups from all areas of the city were
voicing support for the Redmond Plan, The Executive Board of Chicago Teachers
Union resolved support of the school busing proposals and urged implementation
and approval immediately and without further delay. The Union further
requested the board to file suit immediately to compel the State of Illinois to
discharge its constitutional obligations to provide equal educational opportunity
for all children attending the public schools of the state. The Redmond Report
was cautiously but increasingly becoming accepted.
In 1975, Redmond announced to the board of education that he would not seek
reappointment as general superintendent. He left for a final vacation 1 June after
being head of the Chicago Public Schools for nine years. His contract would not
expire until 13 September, therefore the school board set about to find a
replacement. A newspaper editorial printed the following:
School system with 50,000 employees and 530,000 pupils seeks man with
vision of philosopher, organizational ability of political boss, efficiency of
corporation executive and finesse of Vatican diplomat to put public education
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back on the track in Chicago. Must be able to spend $1 billion a year wisely.
Salary: negotiable to $65,000 with excellent fringe benefits. 61
Board members pressed for commitments in two areas they felt were
shortcomings during Redmond's administration. They faulted him for permitting
deficient principals and administrators to keep their positions and for making
infrequent visits to schools.62 They were seeking a new direction.
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CHAPTER III
JOSEPH HANNON AND NEW DIRECTIONS
Hannon Before Becmnini Superintendent
In 1970, an executive recruiting firm found Joseph P. Hannon working at the
University of Northern Colorado as a graduate research assistant. Later that year,
he was hired by James Redmond as Facilities Planning Superintendent for the
Chicago schools. On 23 July 1975, the school board passe~ a motion to appoint
Dr. Joseph P. Hannon as General Superintendent of Schools for four years, and
on 24 July he was appointed with an effe~tive starting date of 14 September.
Hannon's Shaky BeKinninis

as Leader

Dr. Hannon inherited a myriad of problems. A $50 million deficit headed the
list. In addition, reading scores were low; minority student percentages had
increased but minority teacher percentages had not; the United States
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) was threatening to cut off
up to $100 million in federal funds for the school system's failure to integrate
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faculty; pupil desegregation was almost an impossibility and worst of all, a
crippling teachers' strike was already in progress.63
Toe strike ended four days after Hannon's contract took effect, but damage had
been done. Ninety-six percent of the teachers had stayed away from school; seven
class days would have to be made up at the end of the schoolyear; and the deficit
was widened due, in part, to the teachers' raise. Hannon had indeed inherited a
monumental and unenviable task. 64 In addition, he was faced with a great deal
of opposition due to his election over the immediate Deputy Superintendent,
Manford Byrd, who was black. In light of the circumstances, however, Hannon's
response was:
I've been brought in as a head coach, and I think if you're going to have a
winning season you've got to expect the maximum out of everyone on the
team. And those that cannot produce, I think they no longer should be on
the team. The critical aspect is to have in each one of the working stations
people who are highly committed to what their jobs are supposed to be.65
Hannon went on to say that with the decreasing white population, desegregation
in Chicago was a moot issue. He felt that the critical needs were to provide good
schools wherever the children were and to provide alternatives so that if parents
and/ or children wanted to go to a different location, they could do so. A
63
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confident young superintendent had taken a stand but the pressures of heading
Chicago's schools were just beginning.
By the end of 1975 Hannon had another immediate pressing problem to
address: the concerns of HEW (under Title IX of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act) whose officials had threatened earlier that year to cut federal
funds1 to Chicago if the teaching staff was not integrated. Early in 1976, Dr.
Hannon submitted a summary of a plan to the Office for Civil Rights (OCR)
which was in direct response to HEW's request to remediate segregation policies
in order to comply with Title VI by September 1976. The document was an
attempt to put together in one resource booklet the facts and figures related to
the Plan to Inte~ate Local School Faculties, EQUalize Staff Services. and Provide
Special Services to National Ori~in Minority Children,
The Office for Civil Rights (OCR) rejected the plan and asked for additional
information. OCR informed Dr. Hannon that it had reviewed data to determine
how faculty and staff were assigned to create or maintain the racial identifiability
of schools. Moreover, OCR wanted to know whether teachers were assigned so
that minority group students were taught by teachers with less experience or less
professional training than nonminority students. Finally, the office wanted to
determine whether or not equally effective educational opportunities were
provided to national origin minority children.66

66t'Response to the Request from the Office for Civil Rights, Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, for a Plan to: Integrate faculties, Equalize
professional staff services, Provide special services to national origin minority
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Next, the HEW Office for Civil Rights requested a plan to be submitted within
sixty days outlining steps to be taken by Chicago Public Schools for assigning
faculty and ways that would comply with desegregation.

By September 1976

OCR expected the ratio of minority to nonminority personnel in each of the
district's schools to be substantially the same as the ratio of the district as a
whole. Within the same timeframe the proportion of teachers with extensive
professional education and experience and the proportion of teachers with lesser
amounts of professional training and teaching experience were to be comparable
in all of the district's schools. In addition, OCR expected each student who spoke
a primary language other than English to be provided special instructional services
necessary to ensure equally effective participation in all of the district's
educational programs. 67
Joseph Hannon requested an additional extension of sixty days to respond to
the Office for Civil Rights request, and he outlined the steps that would be
necessary for Chicago to comply with the provisions of Title VI as:
(1) collecting and analyzing current data on the characteristics of students

and programs for the 1975-76 school year as they relate to the regulations of
Title VI;
(2) developing assessment techniques for the identification of the English
language proficiency of national origin minority students;

children," (Chicago Public Schools, 8 February 1976), viii.
67
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(3) reviewing the regulations of Title VI with the Chicago Teachers Union;
(4) reviewing and discussing the provisions of Title VI with the board of
education and developing recommendations related to a plan for compliance
for the board's approval;
(5) coordinating the regulations of Title VI with the requirements of the
State of Illinois for mandated bilingual education programs and for school
district desegregation plans;
(6) developing instructional models that meet programmatic needs in
schools with students of national minority origins who have English language
problems;
(7) identifying sources of funding for the development of assessment
techniques, instructional models, and staff inservicing;
(8) studying alternative methods of reallocating support services in schools
attended by national minority students; and
(9) establishing procedures for identifying individual racial and ethnic data
on students and staff.68
Hannon went on to specifically state that in schools in which more than 50
percent of the teachers were non-black, no more than 75 percent of its teachers
should be non-black in the future. In addition, in schools in which more than 50
percent of the teachers were black, no more than 75 percent of the teachers
should be black in the future. To achieve these goals, he proposed to: intensify a
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program for recruitment of black and minority teachers and establish a review
board which would help to enhance and/or maintain faculty integration.
Unfortunately, unbalanced faculty integration still existed. To rectify the situation
and to be in compliance with OCR, the superintendent's office projected a
mandatory reassignment of teachers. Criteria included matching minority with
non-minority teachers and reassigning or exchanging those teachers if certification
and subject areas matched. Based on the January 1976 survey, no less than 5,700
teachers would be affected. However, a realistic figure projected that more than
8000 teachers would be reassigned. 69 September 1977 found the number of
teachers reassigned to enhance integration at thirteen hundred.70 Actual
transfers were a far cry from the projected ones. Hannon would learn, at a later
date, that OCR would not accept the teacher transfer plan.

In 1969 when the Justice Department first threatened legal action to force
increased faculty integration, 213 of 578 schools had all-black or all-white teaching
staffs. 71 After the teacher transfer plan in 1977, only a slight racial shift from
1969 proportions for faculty integration was indicated in a post survey. In some
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instances, schools fell out of compliance because of declining enrollment. One
school spokesman explained:
A school may be just within the required range but then lose a teacher
because of an enrollment drop. The teacher with the least seniority is
reassigned. If that teacher is black and the school is predominantly white, the
reassignment will increase the percentage of white faculty members and the
school will not be in compliance again until a vacancy occurs and can be filled
with another black teacher. 72
Nevertheless, Hannon and the board thought progress was being made because
the schools were attempting in good faith to integrate faculty without totally
disrupting the school system.
An equally important goal of the Chicago Board of Education was to provide

each student who spoke solely or primarily a language other than English, with
special instructional services necessary to ensure equal, effective participation in
the Chicago educational programs. Identifying the students and providing
appropriate staff were the immediate goals. Inservicing staff, involving parents
and community members, monitoring and evaluating were to come later.
Planning for desegregation of the schools would require concurrent activity in
determining the educational soundness, administrative efficiency and economic
feasibility of each alternative course of action. Hannon recognized that equalizing
educational opportunity for all students was the most important issue. However,
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the task would be great since neither he nor his predecessors had addressed it
before and unanticipated circumstances might arise during the planning phases of
the desegregation effort which could result in shifts or changes.
On 26 January 1977, the board of education passed a resolution, which was
prescribed by the Illinois Board of Education, "to develop, adopt, and implement
a comprehensive Equal Educational Opportunity Plan designed to meet the
criteria for conformance with the Rules Establishing Req_uirements and
Procedures for the Elimination and Prevention of Racial Segregation in
Schools."73 A confidential working draft was sent to the Office for Civil Rights
to ensure that this plan to meet the Illinois resolution would also comply with
OCR guidelines. The plan was as follows:
September 1977; (2)

(1) to integrate faculties by

to eliminate any identifiable pattern of principal

assignment; and (3) to provide "appropriate" bilingual services.74 Dr. Hannon
and the board of education seemed to be in control and headed in the right
directions, but in February 1977, a federal judge in administrative law rendered a
decision which held that the Chicago Board of Education was in violation on the
federal faculty/staff racial factor and bilingual issue but was not in violation of the
faculty experience factor.
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In April, a special consultant was appointed by HEW to assist in the
negotiations with the board in the settlement of the Title VI proceedings. 75
During the month of May, a series of meetings were held between staff from the
Office for Civil Rights and the Chicago public schools to "negotiate" provisions
included in the 20 January 1977 plan submitted to OCR. On 25 May, The
Chicago Board of Education adopted the Plan for the Implementation of the
Provisions of Title VI of the Civil Ri~ts Act of 1964 Related To: Inte&ration of
Faculties, Assi&nment Patterns of Principals and Bili1W,1al Education Proifatns.
During the summer months of June through August 1977, teachers and principals
were transferred and reassigned to meet the 25 May compliance goals of the
federal government. In addition, procedures for the implementation of the
bilingual education component were finalized. 76 A foundation which had been
laid for many months was finally being completed.

Creatin&

the Plan

Designing a quality plan became a challenge to members of the board of
education, to staff, to parents, to community members, to civic and business
leaders and to the general public. The challenge simply put was to make certain
that every child had access to the best education that could be provided and to
make the Chicago public school system one outstanding example of what public
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education could be. The challenge was to enhance "excellence" in the schools and
to give each child full and open "access" to it. Under the superintendency of
Jospeh P. Hannon, the plan became known as Access to Excellence,n Though
the plan was submitted in April 1978, it was designed to become fully realized by
the 1982-83 school year. There were three major parts to the plan. First, district
programs were educational initiatives such as program options which would be
undertaken by each of the twenty-seven districts to serve primarily, but not
exclusively, the students within the district. Secondly, system programs such as
magnet schools offering specialized courses were to be used as initiatives that
would emoll students from all part~ of the city. Students would be able to attend
an academic center offering programs of personal interest even though the
program would be in a district other than the one in which the student might live.
Finally, central office administrative actions were to offer initiatives that would
afford students the opportunity to extend their school year through the summer, to
emoll in the school of their choice and to attend improved educational facilities.
During the interim period of 1978-79, twenty-seven basic skills programs and
twenty-seven district-selected programs were to be implemented. Each district
would establish a basic skills program so that students needing intensive work in
reading, mathematics, and language arts would have access to services that would
help them to pin skills necessary for further learning. In addition, each district
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would develop and implement a program to serve a particular need or interest of
students in the district. The educational initiatives would include academic
interest centers, enriched studies programs, high school bilingual centers, career
education programs, magnet schools and preschool programs. Summarily, every
program in every category was designed to attract a racially and ethnically diverse
group of students with common interests and aspirations. Through board
administrative actions, summer school would be offered for students to extend
their learning opportunities. In addition, students would be allowed to seek out
the schools in the city offering programs of personal interest. Finally, new
classroom building facilities would be constructed so that a majority of the mobile
classrooms could be eliminated. 78
At the core of the plan was the concept of "access to excellence." Each student
would be given the chance to choose from an array of educational alternatives.
Students would be viewed as individuals with individual interests, needs and
potentials. The uniqueness of each student would be emphasized thereby
encouraging children to see themselves and others as individuals rather than as
stereotypes. 79
For the programs to be fully developed into operational activities in the schools,
mechanisms for implementation were needed. In order to make certain that
students would be able to participate in the programs offered thereby ensuring an
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environment conducive to learning, the following services would be provided.
First, students participating in programs implemented under the plan would be
provided with transportation if they attended a school outside the attendance area
in which they lived and if that school would not be within walking distance.

Second, elementary pupils would be transported by contracted vehicles and high
school students would be provided with carfare for public transportation.80 The
success of the plan to equalize educational opportunities in the Chicago public
schools would depend in large measure upon the continuing involvement and
commitment of the various segments of the community and particularly upon the
parents of the students. The plan would provide for civic participation at all
levels and in all phases of the implementation. District and school advisory
councils would have a major part in selecting or designing.

During the

implementation of "access" the advisory councils would be informed of progress,
problems, and accomplishments and would, in turn, advise staff on suggested
program refinements. The systemwide involvement of the community would
continue through the City-Wide Advisory Committee (CWAC). CWAC would
serve as an advisory group in the development and implementation of programs
and would be informed of progress, results, and any proposed modifications of the
programs. CWAC would also serve as one means of communication between the
various groups and bodies appointed and the public school system. 81
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Hannon's plan seemed to cover all bases, but an underlying factor for its success
was money. The board of education was operating with a deficit of $97.5
million. 82 The Chicago Board of Education looked to the Illinois General
Assembly to provide the financial support which would enable the board to
successfully carry out the desegregation rules of the State Board of Education.
The board would work to cooperate with the state in order to receive funds. In
addition, Dr. Hannon would solicit monies from federal agencies. Workshops
would be scheduled, consultants would be hired, teams would be formed, and
program models would be designed. With all of this, Hannon and the board of
education believed that the Access

to Excellence plan would become a reality.

Makin& the Plan Work
On 1 March 1979, a local newspaper printed that federal officials had prepared
a letter charging Chicago public schools with student segregation. The federal
government was demanding a citywide desegregation plan. The Office for Civil
Rights confirmed that the letter had to be reviewed and approved by Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare Joseph Califano.83 The letter focused solely on
student segregation and charged Chicago public schools with violating the Civil
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Rights Act of 1964 in its student assignment policies and practices. In part, the
letter read:
Specifically, we have determined that the racially segregated conditions in the
Chicago public schools are, in substantial part, the result of various policies
and practices of Chicago school officials. These conditions have been created,
maintained, and exacerbated through the placing of mobile classroom units at
certain schools; selecting sites for new or expanded school facilities; creating
and altering attendance area boundaries for elementary schools; establishing
optional zones and feeder patterns for middle schools, upper grade centers
and high schools; implementing student transfer programs; using segregative
busing; establishing vocational high school attendance zones and admission
criteria; and assigning faculty and other professional staff. The actions and
omissions of Chicago school officials in these areas have contributed to racial
segregation in the Chicago public schools and demonstrate the intent of
school officials to segregate students by race. The information reviewed by
OCR further shows that the violation is systemwide. The segregative effects
of the actions and omissions of Chicago school officials have indirectly or
directly affected virtually all of Chicago's schools.84
The letter also requested that the board of education be required to "fashion a
systemwide remedy" to eliminate student segregation. No school would be
exempt. Chicago schools were instructed to develop a plan which would not
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group black and Hispanic students as a single ethnic race. OCR acknowledged
that Congress had enacted legislation prohibiting HEW from ordering busing to
eliminate segregation. Yet it stated that the Civil Rights Act prohibited it from
accepting an inadequate desegregation plan. If a desegregation plan would not be
voluntarily submitted, the case could likely be referred to the Justice Department
for a federal suit. Dr. Hannon and the board would be given ninety days to
submit a plan.
The very next day, newspaper headlines printed that Chicago schools could lose
$26 million in aid from the federal government and $500 million in state and

federal funds. The newspapers further explained that U.S. officials seemed willing
to help the school system resolve its dilemma by recommending that a six-agency
task force help Chicago develop a school desegregation plan that would include
busing but minimize the white flight to the suburbs.s.s OCR proposed a strategy
for the task force to speed up residential desegregation both within the Chicago
school district and across district lines. The proposal would be accomplished by
using HUD programs to encourage movement of blacks to the suburbs and whites
to the city. 86 Gary Orfield, a University of Illinois associate professor, urged the
Illinois school board to consider a new desegregation policy solely for Chicago
schools. "A new strategy is needed for Chicago and the emphasis should be on
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stabilizing existing integrated neighborhoods," Orfield stated.87 In response,
Hannon referred to Orfield's "credentials and expertise" as "one of the architects
of the Los Angeles desegregation plan--a mandated program that many critics
have termed a major failure." 88
While Orfield was condemning Access to Excellence, others such as state school
superintendent, Joseph Cronin, were embracing it. He agreed that Hannon's
"access" program was indeed succeeding in desegregating students. However,
Cronin told a meeting of the Illinois State Board of Education that he wanted the
Chicago school board to prepare a new plan to further push desegregation in the
school year beginning in September 1979. The state board of education's Equal
Educational Opportunities Committee, however, rejected Cronin's resolution to
ask Chicago to submit additional desegregation plans. They wanted to study the
new status report of Chicago's schools before taking action.89 Prepared by
Chicago and state school board staffs, the report stated the following: (1) thirtyfour schools, with 16,649 students, had been desegregated under the program; (2)
224 (38.2 percent) schools had achieved minimum acceptable desegregation; (3)
179 schools had been "positively effected by Access to Excellence in terms of

desegregation"; (4) 91.5 percent of all schools had been participating in Access to
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_Excellence either by sending or receiving students taking part in the program; and
(5) 25,556 of the 490,000 Chicago public school students had been voluntarily
participating in access to excellence programs.90 The joint committee concluded
that the plan was beginning to succeed in desegregating Chicago's public schools
and that substantial progress had been made during the first year of the five-year
plan. 91 Cronin still held to an earlier statement that Chicago should be
required to desegregate an additional twenty-thousand students which would begin
September 1979. The state education committee finally concurred.

Mountin~ Government Charies
The spring of 1979 was not a pleasant one for Joseph Hannon. The federal
government accused the board of perpetuating segregation in its schools and
threatened to file a suit against the board unless a comprehensive desegregation
plan could be prepared by September. In a letter to Dr. Hannon, Joseph Califano
said the board's Access to Excellence program, "does not correct the violations
identified."92 He did suggest that the program could serve as a foundation for an
acceptable plan which would have to be approved by the school board by
midsummer in order to be implemented by September. Otherwise, HEW would
be obligated under a federal court order to refer the matter to the Justice
90Jbid.
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Department. It had previously agreed to file a suit to force desegregation if the
board failed to submit a new plan or if it submitted one that was not acceptable
to HEW. H a suit were filed, it would mean that a desegregation plan could be
imposed upon the city's schools by a federal judge.93 An official from HEW
made it clear to Dr. Hannon that the violations were serious.
In tracing case after case using the board's own official records, the federal
report stated: ''The evidence demonstrates that school officials contained black
students in segregated black schools while protecting whites in racially identifiable
white schools."94 HEW went on to say that these overt, official acts of
segregation were accomplished through four means: by building new schools and
additions and adding mobile classrooms; by creating and changing school
attendance boundaries, optional zones and feeder patterns; by using student
transfer programs and segregative busing and by selectively assigning faculty and
staff. HEW charged that over the years, the board chose sites for new schools
that created or maintained segregation. The report cited that ten new high
schools which opened between 1968 and 1977 were intended for students of a
particular race. Seven--Manley, Austin Branch, King, Julian, Collins, Robeson
and Corliss--opened with enrollments of more than 90 percent black; Curie was 83
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percent white: Clemente was 76 percent Latino and Juarez was 93 percent
Latino. 95
Additionally, the government charged that the board "contained" black children
living in the Cabrini-Green housing project. It went on to say that two additions
built during the 1950s to Jenner Elementary School, near the project, pushed
enrollment to 3,711 while the board refused to reassign any black children living
in the project to nearby white schools on the Near North Side. HEW said that
such containment occurred even though enrollments at two nearby white
elementary schools, Headley and Thomas, decreased so much by 1959 that they
were combined into one administrative unit. Also nearby was predominantly white
Ogden Elementary school which had three empty classrooms in 1961. Instead of
taking action to relieve Jenner by shifting its pupils to Ogden, the board changed
attendance boundaries between Ogden and Franklin, a predominantly black
elementary school. This, the government contended, permitted most of the
remaining whites at Franklin to switch to Ogden. Lincoln and La Salle, two other
mainly white elementary schools on the near north side, also had space, according
to HEW. "No effort was made to utilize these nearby white campuses to
accommodate more equitably the large black student enrollments in this area," it
said. 96
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In addition, the government charged that the containment pattern was repeated
elsewhere when the black population expanded. It stated that the board built
seven schools on the southwest side between 1970 and 1974, all with
predominantly black faculties and all-black enrollments, in the Ashland Avenue
corridor which was a dividing line between white and black neighborhoods. As
blacks pushed westward across Ashland Avenue, the board bent under pressure
from whites in initiating other containment measures. Among these, according to
the report, were placing mobile classrooms at black Altgeld Elementary School
instead of permitting black children to switch to nearly white schools and
returning some black children to Cook Elementary School from the predominantly
white school after all-night vigils and picketing by whites. More charges stated
that the board contributed significantly to segregation in the South Shore area.
By 1965, it said, predominantly black O'Keefe and Parkside elementary Schools
had mobile classrooms due to overcrowding, but two nearly white elementary
schools, Coles and Bradwell, had none. Byrn Mawr and Mann each had two
mobile units although they were both integrated. Use of mobile classrooms at
Coles and Bradwell in 1965 'would have helped to accommodate expanding
enrollments and to integrate a wider, more stable area," HEW said, but the board
did not take that action. Three years later, it rejected another attempt to stabilize
South Shore schools when it voted down a proposal by Superintendent James
Redmond to bus children up to three miles from Bryn Mawr and Mann to Coles
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and other schools.rn The board was also accused of using optional attendance
zones which gave students living in a given area the choice of two or more
schools. HEW viewed it as a segregation device.
A permissive transfer plan to relieve overcrowded elementary schools had
"significant potential for accomplishing integration," according to HEW, but the
board imposed various limitations and conditions that discriminated against black
children. One case cited was: in 1969, graduates of predominantly white Barton
and Foster Park Elementary schools could opt for either Calumet or Harper High
Schools. The choice gave these graduates the opportunity to stay out of Calumet,
the government said. But by 1972, when Foster Park and Barton had become
predominantly black, the board ended the optional zone, requiring all graduates
again to attend Calumet as their neighborhood high school.
The government cited other instances where black students were contained in
black schools but an irony was evident: the incidents prompting the segregation
charges had happened before Hannon became superintendent. Joe Hannon,
nevertheless, would have to "take the heat" and would need to begin rectifying the
mounting problems. The government warned that while it was optimistic about
Hannon's ability to develop a plan acceptable to the government, it did not have a
proposal to offer. Meanwhile, the government declared the board ineligible to
receive desegregation aid under the Emergency School Aid Act, but it added that
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an acceptable plan would ''waive" the ineligibility.98 Dr. Hannon denied the
government's charges while promising to cooperate with federal officials to resolve
existing problems. He had to clear the way for much-needed federal funding for
other school programs.

Satisfyin~ the Government
David Tatel, director of HEW's Office of Civil Rights, delivered a letter to
Superintendent Hannon 10 April 1979. The document expressed concern for
Chicago's segregated schools and asked that negotiations for a citywide
desegregation plan start promptly. Tatel, representing the government, warned
that if Chicago refused to begin negotiations, he would refer the case to the
Justice Department for court action. 99 During an interview with a local
newspaper, Mr. Tatel said that although white students are only 21 percent of the
total school enrollment of 494,000, the school board could take a number of
actions to increase desegregation well beyond Hannon's Access to Excellence
plan. HEW would also insist that Chicago produce a second mandatory plan for
use in case the voluntary proposal didn't work. "If whites don't volunteer to go to
"magnate" [sic] schools with blacks, then we want some guarantees that they will
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be required to," Tatel said. 100 The office also reported that the Chicago school
system lost $30 million in 1978 and would stand to lose another $42 million in
emergency aid funds if it failed to submit an acceptable desegregation plan.101
He gave "off the record" suggestions but emphasized that he did not want to
impose any plan on Chicago. 102 He said that even the best of desegregation
plans would still leave a number of schools with all-black emollments. Finally, he
admitted that a key factor in seeking a Chicago desegregation plan was the
National Association for Advancement of Colored People's (NAACP) suit against
HEW seeking a court order to compel the federal government to complete its
investigations in all northern school segregation cases.
Joseph Hannon responded by sending a letter to federal officials asking for a
hearing to give the Chicago school system a chance to tell its side of the
segregation controversy. "We're not guilty of the allegations," he said. "We
should be made eligible for funding." 103 Hannon set about to challenge the
government findings and convince federal officials that Chicago had indeed made
substantial strides toward desegregation, primarily through his Access to
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Excellence plan. 104 He said that federal officials had been investigating Chicago
schools for more than two years and were handling school segregation charges
differently from similar allegations in other cities. Usually, the federal
government contends that a local school system has violated the federal Civil
Rights Act and asks that a desegregation plan be submitted for its approval. For
Chicago, an exception was made because the federal government rejected the
school board's application for desegregation funds under the Emergency School
Aid Act in the hope that Chicago would develop a plan to make it eligible for
funds. 105

Hannon was given two choices by federal officials: either ask for a

"show cause" hearing to prove the charges incorrect or ask for a waiver to receive
funding. He felt that asking for the latter would be an admission of guilt. He
chose the first option when he stated that his Access

to Excellence program,

which was developed in response to the Illinois Board of Education desegregation
demands, was indeed a strong one. 106 Hannon's frustration was evident when
he stated that the problem of integrating Chicago public schools surfaced long
before his superintendency. In addition, he intended to ask federal officials,
"What was good enough?" and "What did they mean by compliance?"107

The Problems Mount
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On 4 May 1979, Dr. Hannon was scheduled to appear before officials of the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to show cause why federal funds
to the Chicago public school system should not be cut off. He reportedly asked
that his hearing be made public. In addition, four Chicago aldermanic
representatives were scheduled to make the trip to Washington, D.C. for the
proceedings. One alderman, Clifford Kelley, had submitted a resolution earlier
calling for Joseph Hannon's dismissal as school superintendent. One of the
grounds for dismissal cited was the action taken by HEW in threatening to cut off
federal school funding unless the board of education improved its program for
school desegregation. Alderman William Lipinski, chair of the Chicago city
council's newly-formed Education Committee, confirmed that one of the reasons
he was making the trip was to see if Hannon had an adequate explanation for
Chicago's desegregation plans.108 At the Washington D.C. hearing, Hannon
defended his Access

to Excellence plan in stating that it had been a factor in

stabilizing neighborhoods. He added, "If we don't stay with this plan, we could
lose the greatness of Chicago.... The burden of proof is on the accuser, not the
accused," he emphasized. He asked federal officials to revoke their findings that
Chicago schools were deliberately segregated and make the school system eligible
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for $36 million in funds under the Emergency School Aid Act which provides
money for desegregation programs.109
The Access

to Excellence plan had now become part of Hannon's response to

state demands for school desegregation. Two days after his return from the
Washington hearings, the board of education voted to expand the Access

to

Excellence programs by adding thirteen sites for use as language academies,
classical schools and preschool programs, effective in September.110 Several
weeks later, more sites were slated for the 1979 fall access program but on 26
May, the superintendent was notified that HEW stood by its previous charges that
official board actions led to segregation. The government reiterated an earlier
conclusion that Access

to Excellence did little to reduce segregation.

Having lost the appeal, Hannon had the option of negotiating with HEW for a
new desegregation plan or facing the likelihood of a federal court suit seeking to
force desegregation. HEW stated that "although there were many sound
educational programs contained in Access

to Excellence, it did not correct the

unlawfully segregated conditions that had been identified. 111 The
superintendent's reply to the news was that he would continue talks with the
federal government. However, his disgust was evident when he retorted that some
1

®Barbara Reynolds, "Hannon denies federal charges of segregation," Chic3,i0
Tribune, 5 May 1979, 3.
11

°Casey Banas, "Add 12 schools to "Access" plan, Chic3,iO Tribune, 10 May 1979,

5.
111

Barbara Reynolds and Meg O'Connor, "HEW holds to school bias charge,"
Chica~o Tribune, 26 May 1979, 9.

75
middle-level federal officials pressing for desegregation had become regulatory
characters with almost demonic powers. He said that the officials were acting as
'judge, jury, and hangman" over Chicago public schools.112
However, federal officials reaffirmed their position that Chicago was not eligible
for federal desegregation funds because the school system, over the years, had
taken deliberate actions to contain black students in black schools. Since many of
the "access" programs involved students for only part of the day or the school
year, HEW rejected it. The government also rejected Chicago's definition of
desegregation. Under Chicago's standard, a school was desegregated when no
more than 90 percent of its students belonged to one race. Under federal
standards, with white and black students only, a school was desegregated when its
full-time student enrollment was 25 to 50 percent white and 50 to 75 percent
black. A school with white, black and Latino enrollments would be desegregated
with 15 to 35 percent white, 50 to 70 percent black and 15 to 35 percent
Latino.113 Dr. Hannon reminded a determined HEW that with white
enrollment at an all-time low and dropping, ~ plan would have to take the
"demographic realities" into account. The low percentage of white students had
made .total desegregation in Chicago an impossibility. He continued to press for
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HEW's definition of "compliance" and emphasized a willingness to go beyond his
access program.

114

Revampin& "Access"
Again Hannon said that he would be willing to establish goals for the school
system's all-voluntary access to excellence but "would not consider anything
mandatory. I think we've been very consistent about that."115 He went on to
say that thirty-eight thousand students participating in the program for the first
year alone, was proof enough that voluntary plans could work. Access

to

Excellence, he said, "is the most successful, qualitative educational and
desegregation program in urban America."116
On 13 July 1979 Jane Byrne, Mayor of Chicago, announced that she had
met with Joseph Hannon to discuss the progress of desegregation negotiations
with the federal government. She said that "Hannon's staff was preparing an
expanded desegregation plan to present to the Office for Civil Rights." 117
Byrne mentioned that the plan would include "clustering", which involved
combining school populations of three or more schools in proximity. The magnet
schools plus the addition of clustering would require little busing. When asked
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whether the federal government would accept such a plan, Byrne replied that the
public would know once Hannon met with federal officials in Washington,
D.C.us
Hannon's staff had been in meetings with HEW in order to reach an agreement
of how much desegregation was to be achieved in the city's schools and what
measures would be used. Timing would be critical since HEW had demanded
that the city prepare an expanded desegregation plan by mid-September or face a
federal suit seeking to force desegregation. Negotiations were also focusing on a
federal demand for mandatory backup measures to be instituted if voluntary
efforts would fail to meet the goal of achieving desegregation acceptable to
HEW.119 On 26 July, David Tatel, director of the Office for Civil Rights stated:
"We have decided that further progress would be enhanced by developing some
specific desegregation options; one of the options will be busing. 11120 He went
on to say that the plan had to be developed and approved by 15 September but
the implementation date would be determined during negotiations. During the
month of August, the government would be gathering demographic information
from the school board so that the federal government could propose "pairing and
clustering plans." The next step would be for the school board to react to the
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proposed options.121 HEW and the school board seemed to be inching towards
each other.

A Battle Ensues
Pressures on the Chicago schools for massive, mandatory integration had been
building slowly and quietly for years. Now they were about to erupt. One by one,
OCR or the courts had forced on the big northern cities mandatory integration
plans that went far beyond simple desegregation. Now it was Chicago's tum. 122
On 26 August, Patricia Harris, newly appointed secretary of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, announced that even though she would be willing
to help Chicago officials map out an acceptable school desegregation plan, she
would not allow a delay beyond the 15 September deadline.
On 31 August, HEW drafted and released a desegregation proposal for Chicago
public schools that relied on the mandatory busing of 114,000 elementary
pupils. 123 Chicago would not be required to accept it but, if accepted, would
desegregate 60 percent of the city's schools and involve 55 percent of the public
schoolchildren. 124 The proposal was presented as a "feasibility study" which the
government said proved that desegregation could be accomplished in Chicago.
12llbid.
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Joseph Hannon was unavailable for immediate comment but a spokesperson
issued a statement saying top staff members had "serious concerns that the
material presented did not address itself to the educational program for the
children of Chicago public schools."125 HEW had other suggestions to offer in
negotiations but basically, the next move would be left to Hannon and the
Chicago Board of Education.
Further adding to his woes, Hannon's contract as superintendent would be
expiring within the week and the school board would have to vote on whether to
retain or release him. Jesse Jackson, president of Chicago-based People United
to Save Humanity (PUSH), had urged that Hannon be fired because he had not
complied with the law in desegregating the schools. While some highly visible
leaders, such as Chicago city council members, viewed the superintendent with
skepticism, others spoke out in support of his Access to Excellence plan. During
a news conference, Joseph Hannon commented that the HEW study suggesting
that 114,000 schoolchildren be bused to achieve the government's definition of
integration, offered no educational improvements, would not aid the city's stability
and would be costly.126 He now had a revised plan to present to federal
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officials and with the beginning of another schoolyear, his first goal was to "calm
the waters a bit."127
Presentin~ "Access" A&ain
Front-page headlines, one week after school began and two days before the
federal deadline, greeted readers with: HANNON SCHOOL PIAN RUSHED
TO U.S.! 128 The Hannon proposal, an expansion of his Access to Excellence
program, was presented to the board of education in response to the federal
proposal that called for busing. Hannon's extended plan would achieve greater
racial balance throughout the school system.129 It would require thousands of
students to choose new schools because segregated ones would be closed,
overcrowding would be eliminated and racial quotas would be established in order
to maintain integrated schools.130 Hannon, seeking to diffuse busing as an
issue, volunteered: ''The school bus is the key to opening up the school system and
we are not opposed to busing. The important question is not how a child gets to
school, but what the school is offering the child."131 Hannon's revised "access"
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plan targeted four major strategies. His first strategy was to reduce the number of
twenty-seven school districts to twenty. (See Appendix E) The rationale was that
district reduction would increase the number of districts that would contain
diverse racial/ethnic groups. It would also increase the number of students in the
racially diversified districts, thereby increasing the potential for successfully
developing desegregated programs. Because the revision would be solely an
vadministrative reorganization, it would not change student or teacher assignments,
attendance boundaries or high school feeder patterns. Hannon's second strategy
was to target student assignment policies. The policies would be designed to
equalize the use of school facilities and to stabilize enrollments. Hopefully,
mobile classrooms would be eliminated, overcrowding would be reduced,
enrollment ceilings would be established to maintain racial diversity, and selected
school buildings would be closed. In addition, an open enrollment policy would
permit students to apply for an available seat in another school if the move
enhanced desegregation. A third set of strategies would involve new program
models. The ultimate objective for employing the models would be through the
use of part-time programs. By participating in short-term full-day or recurring
part-day learning activities in desegregated groups, children would have an
opportunity to gradually come to know one another as unique individuals.
Parents would be able to discover the positive aspects of desegregated education
and the negative attitudes that could undermine stable desegregation could be
confronted and changed. The final group of recommendations were concerned
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with improving program management and operation. Included were community
involvement, staff development and public information programs. Hannon
proposed that businesses and public agencies "adopt a school" to develop studies
in their business areas of expertise. The goal would be to "adopt" fifty high
schools and one hundred elementary schools. The businesses could help to
develop specialized courses for forty-five hundred students. 132
Hannon did not place a cost estimate on the expanded access program.
However, he prepared a .request for federal funds under the Emergency School
Aid Act which would provide some money for desegregation. Even though the
federal government had rejected Chicago's application for such funds seven times,
Hannon was hopeful that his latest plan would be termed eligible for federal
funds. 133 Though Hannon was optimistic, there were others who were not.
James Compton, president of the Chicago Urban League, had strongly voiced
his opposition to the expanded Access to Excellence desegregation plan. At a
league meeting, Compton cited the controversy surrounding the integration of the
city's schools as indicative of the "selfish attitude that prevailed."134 He went
on to say that even the revised "access" was nothing more than "an effort to
appease and protect the white, middle-class income segment of the population,
132
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rather than serve the minority communities that desperately needed a
comprehensive desegregation plan to open new vistas of educational
opportunity."135
Another citizen felt that integrated policies should foster neighborhood renewal
and stability. Busing was unpopular and not effective.136 Still another citizen
was frightened that her child's education would be disrupted because of overt
racism such as parents yelling "Nigger go home."137 Finally, in a letter to the
newspaper, a Chicago student, wondered why "liberals who want to do what's
good for the kids, won't ask the kids?"138 The schoolyear had gotten off to a
bad start and it seemed to be worsening.
The Court Battle Resumes .• ,
On 18 October the superintendent told the Chicago board of education he had
been informed that HEW Secretary Patricia Harris would send him a letter
announcing Chicago's desegregation case would be received by the Department of
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Justice.139 Hannon asked HEW to extend negotiations for 170 days, but
admitted that he had not considered presenting any modifications of the same
revised Access to Excellence desegregation plan that HEW rejected earlier. 140
Even though Patricia Harris labeled "access" as illegally vague and said that it
would not work well enough to stand a court test, some board members urged
Hannon to resist HEW's demands and fight it out in court.141 Still, Harris had
reminded Hannon of a two-year government study which revealed that for forty
years the Chicago school board had intentionally segregated its schools by the way
it drew school district boundaries, installed temporary classrooms (mobile units)
and located new schools. 142 ''Through its policies and practices, the Chicago
Board of Education ... has confined its minority children to schools that are
separate and unequal, depriving both black and white children of the educational
opportunities promised in the law," Harris said.143

139

Jonathan Landman, "School Board defies U.S.; challenges HEW to court fight,"
Chic3'0 Sun-Times, 18 October 1979, 1.
1

"°1bid.

141

Landman, 10.

142

Ellen Warren, 'Talce school fight to court--HEW," Chica,io Sun-Times, 19
October 1979, 8.
t43Ibid.

85

And Hannon Resi~
On 30 November 1979, the superintendent's performance was yet again
criticized. Harsh words from James Compton were felt when he said: "Hannon's
inability to fulfill his dream of changing the system points out the need to obtain a
replacement who is well-versed in management skills, negotiation techniques and
financial savvy."144 In addition, a new coalition of black civic and church leaders
urged the board to replace Hannon with the black deputy superintendent who was
presently serving.145
(-

To the consternation of some and to the relief of others, Dr. Joseph P. Hannon
made a surprise announcement that he would resign effective 25 January 1980.
Sources said that Hannon believed the schools would never be able to work
through pressing problems such as desegregation and finance until all elements of
the community became actively involved and put education before politics.146
On 16 December still another surprise shook the school system. A muchspeculated rumor that the board would not be able to meet its payroll was
surfacing. The board found itself unable to borrow working funds in the financial
markets and state government refused to rescue the board once again. 147 As
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leader of Chicago's schools, Hannon would have to absorb the bruises and take
the blame. Only, he was no longer the superintendent. He had resigned two days
earlier. Joseph Hannon had gone but his

Access to Excellence plan had "planted

patches of progress" acknowledged even by some of his critics.148

Aftermath
In the midst of a crisis, there was no superintendent. Speculation ran high that
money would be found to pay employees. Rumor became a stark reality when
paychecks scheduled for 21 December did not arrive. With morale at an all-time
low and the possibility of schools shutting down, Angeline P. Caruso, Associate
Superintendent of Curriculum and Instruction Services, was appointed interim
superintendent. In addition, all school board members, except one, were asked
to resign.
Caruso served until Dr. Ruth Love, Chicago's first black school superintendent,
was hired April 1980. In May, ten new members were appointed to the board of
education and one of their first acts was the creation of a student desegregation
committee. A consent decree resulted after the committee entered into
negotiations with government officials during the summer. The decree was
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entered in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 24
September 1980 under presiding Judge Milton Shadur.149
The decree stated:
The United States has filed a complaint alleging that the Board of Education
of the City of Chicago has engaged in acts of discrimination in the assignment
of students and otherwise, in violation of federal law. The United States
alleges further that such acts have had a continuing system-wide effect of
segregating students on a racial and ethnic basis in the Chicago public school
system. In addition, the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare
in 1979 and in 1980 found the Board ineligible for funding under the
Emergency School Aid Act on the basis of its determinations that the Chicago
public school system is characterized by racially segregated and overcrowded
schools. Following a presentation of facts by the Board in defense of its
actions, these HEW determinations were reaffirmed by the Department of
Education on June 12, 1980.150
As a result of the decree, a plan was put in place to create the greatest

practicable number of stably desegregated schools and to provide educational and
related programs for any black or Hispanic schools remaining segregated.
Hopefully, educational disadvantages of past or continuing racial isolation would
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be lessened. 151 The Chicago Board of Education and Superintendent Love
entered into a new era with the old problem of desegregating its schools.

151
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CHAPTERIV
CONCLUSION

Overview
In 1954 the Supreme Court declared segregation in public education to be
unconstitutional. In 1967 James Redmond presented a plan which proposed the
first out-and- out integration program in Chicago school history. In 1977 the
Chicago Board of Education, under the leadership of Joseph Hannon, passed a
resolution designed to meet criteria which would establish requirements and
procedures for the elimination and prevention of racial segregation in the city's
public schools. By the end of 1979 Hannon was gone and desegregation had not
occurred.
Twenty-five years passed from the time Chief Justice Warren announced his
landmark decision until the time Superintendent Hannon announced his
resignation from the school system. Within that timespan, desegregation in public
education had been a primary topic of discussion. What had not been addressed
was that historically, being educated in segregated settings had been a way of life
for many black and white children in America and in Chicago.

After the

decree, pressure was put on school systems to desegregate as set forth by
constitutional law.
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Although Redmond and Hannon inherited overriding problems, both presented
programs that they thought: (1) would address answers to desegregating
Chicago's schools; and (2) would be answers to the federal government's
mandates. One might wonder then if gains were made in eliminating racial
segregation in the public schools under the superintendencies of James Redmond
and Joseph Hannon. Looking back at past events might help the city's school
system avoid future mistakes.
Redmond in Retrospect
Redmond proposed two plans to integrate the schools. The earlier plan, Project
Wingspread, was a city-suburban endeavor between Chicago and Highland Park
public schools that would help to develop an understanding between central city
and suburban youth. Both groups were to exchange classrooms in the morning
and then spend time together involved in a curriculum of metropolitan studies in
the afternoon. A six-week pilot summer program was planned which was to be
followed by a semester program. Funding was to come from private and
government sources but much needed funds never surfaced and the program was
forgotten.
Redmond's second "bold and comprehensive" desegregation plan followed
shortly after "Wingspread" when as part of the plan, he proposed that more than a
thousand black children be bused some distance from their homes. At first, the
school board embraced his plan but as details of implementation costs, lengthy
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travel times and fear of bodily harm became available to the school board, the
members reassessed the plan and rejected the designed busing scheme. 152 In
addition, bitter opposition from white parents as well as hesitance from black
parents placed pressure on the school board to revise Redmond's
recommendations. 153 Redmond's plan did not allow for parental input. While
the board could not leave pupil placement decisions to parents, the parents could
not be ignored either. With negative factors heavily outweighing the positive
ones, overwhelming controversy dulled further efforts to implement the large and
comprehensive Redmond Plan. Redmond's efforts to desegregate were
commendable, but his plan failed. The school board realized the costs and
rejected it. There was not enough money for buses, and parents were then asked
to transport their children to school. For any number of reasons: disinterest, lack
of private transportation, too distant or time-consuming, effective desegregation
did not happen.
Hannon in Retrospect
Joseph Hannon also incorporated busing in his efforts to desegregate. Besides,
who would deny any student "access to excellence?" Magnet schools under his
plan offered students an alternative to the regular educational program and was
open to them on a citywide basis. Because magnet schools may draw students
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from a broad area, they can make an important contribution to a desegregation
effort. 154 Perhaps Hannon viewed the magnet school as an attractive technique
in the desegregation effort but, because participation was voluntary, students and
parents had to be convinced that a superior quality education was provided at the
selected magnet school. 155 Though Hannon presented the magnet school as
part of a broad spectrum, public mindset associated magnet schools with
desegregation and probably viewed them with skepticism.
The commission who served on the school desegregation project in 1980 under
the leadership of Robert L. Green, Professor at Michigan State University, stated:
"In order for voluntary techniques like magnet schools to have a significant effect
on a total desegregation effort, the overall plan must incorporate pupil
reassignment. 156 Those who could choose their schools, embraced the "magnet"
ideals; those unable to attend their school of choice saw yet another obstacle to
an equal opportunity for learning.

In the midst of Harmon's woes was the ever-present lack of funding. The
government had denied emergency aid under Title VI and a new HEW secretary,
Patricia Harris, set a deadline date for Hannon to fully desegregate Chicago's
schools. There was not enough time or money to execute a successful
154

Robert L. Green, LEAD consultant, Student Dese~e&ation Plan for the
Chica&o Public Schools: Recommendations on Educational Components and Student
Assi&nment. Board of Education, City of Chicago, 1981, 11.
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desegregation plan. Besides, white flight to suburbs had increased in large
numbers and minority children made up over 80 percent of the schools'
population. Hannon resigned in frustration.

Conclusion
Both Redmond and Hannon involved support staff they had each selected but
both failed to realize that while making policy, the people directly affected should
have been involved in the policy-making decisions. They each put their plans in
place and then notified those affected (schoolchildren and their parents) of the
rules. While implementing their plans, input should have been sought from those
involved so that they could have been made to feel part of the decision-making
process. When introducing this change, the superintendents ignored the
democratic ideology so deeply-rooted in the American way of life. The "key"
players had not been asked to help set the rules. Both leaders seemed to have
firm backing and respect from the board of education. However, pressure from
city government, citizens groups and private parties, caused the board members to
change their minds on critical issues such as busing.
Money was also an issue. Even though one board member questioned where
the money would come from, she voted ''yea" in principle just in case money
would be found later. Funding was anticipated from government revenues but
was not released in some instances. Because Hannon's plan was not acceptable to
the federal government, much needed funding was withheld. Redmond-received a
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federal grant to fund writing his proposed desegregation plan, but, when time
came to implement it, federal funds were lacking.
Neither plan provided recommendations for correcting existing inequities in
faculty racial ratios. Although both plans included strategies for inservicing
personnel in preparation for the new programs, the dollars were not there. Trying
to incorporate new programs into a system with a history of financial crises was
difficult if not impossible. Funding was not the major drawback, however.
During the superintendencies of Redmond and Hannon, while both plans were
anticipating acceptance, several things had happened: (1) white flight from the
city was occurring and growing at a rapid pace, (2) school finances were at crises
proportions, and (3) the federal government was not readily embracing remedies
Chicago was offering. Though both men were attempting to set policy as dictated
by the government, what was not taken into account by each of them was that
segregation had been the American way of life for so long that it was viewed as a
legacy. While Chief Justice Warren and the remaining eight voted what they
thought was right, they did not consider those people who would not embrace
what was constitutionally right. America, for so long, had been accustomed to the
longstanding tradition of segregated educational settings.
In any policy implementation process, leaders must have their pulse on the
attitudes and experiences of the people involved.157 Policy analysts well know
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Professional Educators Publications, 1974.
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that educational policy is not made in a vacuum; it is a product of both history
and contemporary forces. 158 According to ChicaKo Tribune newspaper writers,
Jack Houston and Casey Banas, ''There must be a national recommitment to
public education, a broader understanding of its role in our democracy and a
better appreciation for what it has done and is doing in developing our
society.159 With the lopsided numbers of minorities in the majority in Chicago,
desegregation has become a secondary issue on which many feel too much time
has been spent. A growing sentiment is that we must now be about the business
of giving all public schoolchildren in the city of Chicago a good education.
Desegregation alone does not guarantee that it will happen.
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Paraphrase from Introduction to Education Policy course taught by Dr. Michael
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Jack Houston and Casey Banas, "Active parents are key to many reform
programs," ChicaKo Tribune, 29 May 1988, 1 (sec 4).

BIBUOGRAPHY

Access to Excellence, Recommendations for EQ.Ualizin& Educational
Opportunities. Board of Education: City of Chicago, 12 April 1978.
Access to Excellence, Further Recommendations for Equalizin& Educational
Opportunities. Board of Education: City of Chicago, 12 September 1979.
Adams, Cyrus Hall, ill. Papers. Chicago Historical Society, 1968-1970.
Alexander, Kern, and M. David. The Law of Schools. Students. and Teachers. St.
Paul, Minnesota.: West Publishing Co., 1984.
Annual Dese&,re&ation Review: Student Dese&,re&ation Plan for the Chica&o
Public Schools, 1982-83.
Annual Dese&,re&ation Review: Student Dese&,re&ation Plan for the Chica&o
Public Schools. Student Assi~ent Component, 1987-88.
Board of Education Proceedings, City of Chicago. May 1966.
Board of Education Proceedings, City of Chicago. 3 January-28 June 1967.
Borinski, Ernst. "A Legal and Sociological Analysis of the Integration Decrees of
May 31, 1955". University of Pittsbur&h Law Review. 16 (1955): 329-338.
Borinski, Ernst. "A Legal and Sociological Analysis of the Segregation Decision
of May 17, 1954". University of Pittsbur&h Law Review. 15 (1954): 622-634.
Brown et, al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et. al. 347 U.S. 483 (1953).
Brown et. al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et. al. 349 U.S. 483 (1954).
Chicago Board of Education. Response to the Request from the Office for Civil
Ri~ts, P<a>artment of Health, Educationand Welfare for a Plan to:
Inte&rate faculties. Equalize professional staff services, Provide special
services to national ori&in minority children. 11 February 1976.

96

97
_Chica&o American, 1966-1968.
.Chica&o Daily News, 1966.
Chica&o Sun-Times, " '54 Kansas school bias suit reopens", 6 October 1986.
Chica.KO Sun-Times. 1974-1979.
Chica&o Tribune. 1974-1979.
Cronin, Joseph M. "How the Chicago Area Desegregated Its Schools." Phi Delta
Kappan 58 (1977).
Davidson, Mary.· A Promise of Simple Justice in the Education of Chica&o School
Children? Monitoring Commission for Desegregation Implementation.
Chicago. February 1983.
DeVise, Pierre. "Descent from the Summit: Race and Housing in Chicago since
1966." Ph.D. dissertation. University of Illinois at Chicago, 1985.
Ebony Ma&azine. May 1974.
Eq,ualizin& Educational Opportunities in the New Chica&o. Chicago Public
Schools. February 1977.
Green, Robert L. et al. Student Dese~eption Plan for the Chica&o Public
Schools: Recommendations on Educational Components. Board of
Education: City of Chicago. 1981.
Hauser, Phillip M. et. al. Hauser Report to the Board of Education. City of
Chica&o by the Advismy Panel on Inte~ation of the Public Schools. 31
March 1964.
Havighurst, Robert J. The Public Schools of Chica&o. The Board of Education
of the City of Chicago, 1964.
Herrick, Mary. The Chica&o Schools: A Social and Political History. Beverly
Hills/London: Sage Publications, 1971.
Hudgins, H.C., Jr. "Legal Aspects of School Administration",a monograph.
National Organization on Legal Problems of Education (NOLPE), Kansas.
Kelly, Alfred H. "The Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered: The
Segregation Question." Michi&an Law Review, 54. June, 1956.

98
Kirby, David J., Harris, T. Robert, and Crain, Robert L. Political Strateiies in
Northern School Dese~eption, (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1973).
Kluger, Richard. Simple Justice. New York: Random House, Inc., 1977.
"Legal Sanctions to Enforce Desegregation in the Public Schools: The Contempt
Power and the Civil Rights Acts." Yale Law Journal. 65. (April 1956):
630-659.
Levine, Daniel U. and Moore, Connie C. "Magnet Schools in a Big-City
Desegregation Plan", Phi Delta Kappan. 1976.
Lloyd, Neil E. ''The Decision-Making Process and the Chicago Board of
Education: The 1968 Busing Decision." Ph.D. dissertation, Loyola
University of Chicago, 1974.
McKay, Robert B. "With all Deliberate Speed: A Study of School
Desegregation". New York University Law Review, 31. (1956): 991-1090.
Ogletree, Earl J. "Plight of the Chicago Schools: A Profile of and Interview with
the new Superintendent Joseph Hannon. Chicago, 1976.
Peterson, Paul. School Politics. Chicaio Style. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1976.
Plan for the Implementation of the Provisions of Title YI of the Civil Riihts Act
of 1964 related to: "Inte~ation of Faculties, Assi~ent Patterns of
Princwals and Bilin~al Education Proirams. Chicago Public Schools,
Board of Education, Chicago, 12 October 1977.
Redmond, James F. "Efforts to Desegregate and Decentralize the Administration
of a Large City School System." Address presented at Columbia University.
New York, July 1968.
Redmond, James F. Increasini Deseireiation of Faculties, Students, and
Vocational Education Proirarns. Board of Education: City of Chicago, 23
August 1967.
Response to the Request from the office for Civil Ri~ts, Department of Health.
Education, and Welfare, for a Plan to: Inte~ate faculties, Equalize
professional staff services, Provide special services to national oriiin minority
children. 8 February 1976.

99
Rich, John Martin. New Directions in Educational Policy. Professional Education
Series. Lincoln, Nebraska: Professional Educators Publications, Inc., 1974.
The School Code of 1961, Chapter 22.
"School Desegregation efforts in Chicago ... and other Cities". Papers prepared
for National Conference on Equal Educational Opportunity in America's
Cities. Washington, D.C., 1967.
"Segregation in Education". Boston University Law Review 34. (1954): 463-474.
Shapiro, Sheldon R. "Racial Discrimination in Education - Supreme Court Cases,"
United States Supreme Court Reports. 2d.
Student Dese&re&ation Plan for the Chica&o Public Schools - Annual
Dese~e&ation Review. 1982-83. Executive Summary: Part I: Student
Assi&mnent and Part II: Educational Components. August 1983.
Student Dese~e&ation Plan for the Chica&o Public Schools: Recommendations
on Educational Components. Board of Education - City of Chicago. 1981.
Student Dese~e&ation Plan for the Chica&o Public Schools: Recommendations
on Educational Components and Student Assi&nment. Board of Education City of Chicago, 1981.
Student Dese~e&ation Plan for the Chica&o Public Schools: Systemwide
Strate&ies to Relieve Overcrowdin&. Vol. II, 1989.
"Supreme Court Equity Discretion: The Decrees in the Segregation Cases." .Yale
Law Journal. 64. (1954-55): 124-136.
Swisher, Carl Brent. Historic Decisions of the Supreme Court. New York: D.
Van Nostrand Company, 1969.
Thomas, Charles R. "North Chicago", Inte~rated Education, 15, 6 (1977): 38-9.
Thomas, Charles R. "A Study of Lay Participation in the Elimination of DeFacto
Racial Segregation in a Northern School District." Ph.D. Dissertation,
Northwestern University, 1970.
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. "Techniques for Achieving Racially
Desegregated, Superior Quality Education in the Public Schools of Chicago,
Illinois. Washington, D.C., 1967.

100
U.S. vs. Chicago Board of Education. Consent Decree, 1980.
Vrame, William Anton. "A History of School Desegregation in Chicago Since
1954." Ph. D. dissertation. University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1970.
Wilkinson, J. Harvie. From Brown to Bakke. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1979.
Wnek, Cynthia. "Big Ben, The Builder: School Construction--1953-66." Ph. D.
Dissertation, Loyola University of Chicago, 1988.
Wolters, Raymond. The Burden of Brown: Thirty Years of School
Dese~e&ation. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1984.

101

APPENDIX A

102
Justices voting the landmark Brown I & II decision 17 May 1954 were:
The Honorable Chief Justice Earl Warren
The Honorable Justice Hugo L. Black
The Honorable Justice Stanley Reed
The Honorable Justice Felix Frankfurter
The Honorable Justice William 0. Douglas
The Honorable Justice Robert H. Jackson
The Honorable Justice Harold H. Burton
The Honorable Justice Tom C. Clark
The Honorable Justice Sherman Minton

Source: Brown et, al. v. Board of Education of Topeka

et. al, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Cases argued for equal protection of the laws as guaranteed under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and later known as Brown I & IT were:
Oliver Brown et al., Appellants,
v.

Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County,
Kansas, et al. (No. 1.)
Harry Briggs, Jr., et al., Appellants,
v.

R. W. Elliott et al. (No. 2.)

South Carolina

Dorothy E. Davis et al., Appellants,

v.
County School Board of Prince Edward County,
Virginia, et al. (No. 3.)

Spottswood Thomas Bolling et al., Petitioners,

v.
C. Melvin Sharpe et al. (No. 4.)
Washington, D.C.

Francis B. Gebhart et al., Petitioners,

v.
Ethel Louise Belton et al. (No. 5.)
Delaware
Source: Brown v. Board of Education. Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
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James F. Redmond

BOARD OF EDUCATION

General Superintendent of Schools

CITY OF CHICAGO

Increasing Desegregation of Faculties,
Students, and Vocation Education Programs

~hLL9htj, of the Report Presented to the Board of Education
August 23, 1967

INTRODUCTION

Significantly more integration is desirable throughout the school
system.

In January 1967, the Chicago public schools

received from the United States Office of

Several forces act to prevent staff integration: fear and

Education a statement of findings and

uncertainty, misconceptions, representation of "desertion• of the

recommendations related to Title rl/ of the Civil

teacher's own people, and segregation in housing.

Rights kt. of 1964. A proposal by the Chicago
public schools to initiate action in response to

A program is recommended through which teachers may

the report resulted in a planning grant which

become fully aware of staffing Problems and may aid in their

provided for the employment of specialists to

solution.

assist in seeking solutions to the problems
indicated. The report developed details as a

A city-wide policy should be adopted which would result in each

result of that study: this leaflet presents

school having the same percentage of regularly certified

highlights from the full report.

teachers.

FACULTY

It is necessary to build stability and reduce turnover In the staffs

ASSIGNMENT
PATTERNS
Staffs are presently racially imbalanced.

of all inner city schools.

Significant numbers of more experienced and better qualified
teachers are needed now to balance staffs in inner city schools.

Inner city schools must be made more attractive to teachers.
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Intensive efforts should be made to recruit,

•

prepare, and keep teachers In inner city schools.

Exchange programs within Chicago and with
suburbs

•

Teachers in Inner city schools should be

Joint programs with teacher preparation
institutions concemlng Inner city problems.

provided with guarded parking lots and/or
transportation to and from school.

Attention should be given to modifying the Illinois School Code
to permit assignment and transfer which would promote staff

Instructional groups consisting of the following

integration.

members are recommended as a staffing pattem
for each 150 students:

The May 1967 observation count shows a decrease in all-white
faculties from 44 percent In 1966 to 33.8 percent.

1 master teacher
3 regular teachers
1 beginning teacher
2 practice teachers
3 aides.
Principals who are likely to be successful in Inner

BOUNDAR,IES AND
STUDENT
ASSIGNMENT
POLICIES

city schools should be Identified and selected
for assignment there. A prerequisite to taking
the principal's examination should be 2 to 3

Certain assumptions are basic to the details of this report:

years of service in one inner city school.
•
Professional staff, special classes, and assistance

that integration is desirable for white and Negro
children alike.

of parents and community agencies should be
more widely utilized in providing for children who

•

are serious discipline problems.

that every effort should be made to retain the
white population and promote stabilization in
integrated school situations.

Teacher aides should be available immediately
with or without new organizational pattems.

•

That the responsibility for integration should be
shared by all of the white community by

Community support of teachers should be

maintaining fixed racial proportions in the schools.

immediately and widely cultivated.
•

That efforts should be made to provide

Intensive efforts should be made to reduce

cooperative programs with the private and

absenteeism and to attract and keep substitute

parochial schools in the city as well as the

teachers.

suburban schools in the metropolitan area.

Some activities already in progress should be
continued and expanded:

•

That the present housing segregation pattem in
this city will probably continue for some time,

•

summer school staff integration

making it essential for the Board of Education to

•

Transfer on loan

continue to improve the quality of education in all
schools and particularly in the ghetto schools.
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•

That the transporting of pupils by the

School pairing plans (clustering) should be used in key

school system is necessary to achieve

transition areas to achieve integration and stabilization.

racial integration.
A Metropolitan Ina Educational Council should be established
•

That the funds to implement the

to encourage, expand, and co-ordinate exchange programs

recommendations should be available

betwHn city and suburban schools.

from state or federal as well as local
10urces.

Intermediate Proposals

Magnet schools, both specialized and general purpose, should
The ove~ming percentage of Chicago's

be established, with very broad racially mixed attendance areas.

students attend segregated schools (90 percent
or more of one race).

Long-Range Plans
Education parks should be established, combining many kinds

Any workable plan to decrease segregation must

of educational programs in one location. Several education

be based on details to be worked out at various

parks should be located in a wide variety of places near the

times. All plans must begin immediately.

outer rim of the city.

Children have the opportunity to attend school
only once; those who are currently in school

The cost of not providing adequate education is infinitely

cannot wait for future changes. Plans which can

greater than the cost of providing one which will prepare a

be completed within thrH years are called

young person to support a family. For example, it costs an

short-range in this report; intermediate plans can

average of $2690 to maintain a person in prison and an average

be operating in thrN to seven years.

of $1800 to maintain

a mother and 3 children on relief a year;

Chicago spends only about $600 per student per year while
Long range plans will require ten or more years

suburbs spend more than $1000.

to be fully operative.

Changes in the way funds are raised for education in Illinois can
Short-term Plans

aim toward more equal distribution of opportunity for children.

in fringe area schools (now integrated), the
minority percentage should be limited to a

School and city governments should work more closely together

workable racial balance. In order to maintain the

to effect integration in housing, in schools, and in community

balance, pupils will be transported to a receiving

development.

school in an all-white attendance area not

VOCATIONAL EDUCATION

adjacent to the sending school attendance area.
The Apprentice Program it is the task of society through various
Voluntary tranafers will be available from the

social agencies, especially the schools, to prepare young

inner city to less crowded schools in other parts

people for work.

of the city.
For the general welfare of the nation it is essential that minority

Boundary changes should be made to reduce

groups participate fully in the skilled trades. There are

racial segregation and to aaaiat in neighborhood

proportionately more Negroes in the professions of medicine,

stabilization.

law, and education than in the various apprenticeable trades.
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The Washbume Trade School, operated by the

Open Enrollment in Vocational Schools

Chicago Board of Education, has a serious racial
imbalance in classes. Selection of apprentices is

Enrollment in the ten vocational high schools is open on a city-

made by the various sponsoring

wide basis; however, all except two are segregated schools

agenciea-employera and unions.

(more than 90 percent of one race).

Apprenticeahip la

a work-atudy process; the

Open enrollment should be widely publicized and emphasized.

apprentice spends 1O to 20 percent
of hia time in school and the remainder on the

Active and aggressive recruitment should be city-wide.

job. The sponsor (employer, union, or other)

Recruitment should be most active in grades 10 and 11.

must accept the enrollee. With few exceptions,

Transfer and shared time plans with regular high schools should

apprentices are paid full wagea for each day in

be expanded and publicized.

school.
Vocational offerings, buildings, and equipment should be
Since few school systems operate a trade school,

attractive and up to date.

operation of Washburn• could be discontinued.
However, it is felt that the school should be

Greater variety in programs should be available within the

continued but that every effort be made to

capability of students and the current job opportunities. More

improve racial balances.

summer programs should be offered.

Negro participation can be increased by

Location of the programs should be considered as a means of

increasing the number admitted and decreasing

promoting racial integration. Job placement services should be

the number dropping out of the program.

aided by follow-up of graduates.

Since Negroes have been denied opportunity to

Advisory committees should be established for general policy-

enter and make progress in the trades, many

making and for each career field taught.

have not entered the apprentice program.

PUBLIC

A more effective program of recruitment must be

UNDERSTANDING

adopted.

Advisory committees should be established for
the general functions at Washburn• and for each
individual trade taught. Through these groups,
communication between the school and current
concerns of the trade should be improved.

Studies should be made to determine (1)

By its nature, a public school system depends for maximum
results on understanding and support from the public.
Expansion in public relations operation is essential, especially at
this time when potential for improved education involves
program and policy changes which cannot succeed without
public acceptance.

compliance of trades with federal regulations, (2)
relationship between entrance requirements and

tasks in the trades, and (3) the effectiveness of

Close coordination in and with the local community as well as
with city-wide news agencies is essential.

vocational education in preparation for
employment.

A system of fast, flexible, internal communication is needed to
keep all school personnel fully informed.
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A widespread program of public communication

•

What factors wiH attract both Negro and white

should be initiated to generate interest in and

students from all sections of the city to a magnet

support for Chicago's schools, keeping the

school?

public fully informed.
•

What in-school experiences in addition to

The Department of Communications and

academic activities will encourage adjustment to

Community Relations must be refined and

integration?

updated aa the schools and the communities
change. Public opinion surveys will help

•

determine the tasks of the Department.

The community will be brought into the schools
through visits and tours.

RESEARCH
Information can be provided through research
which can determine the makeup of a program
or policy, changes during operation, and the
wisdom of continuing or ending a program or
policy.

Research involves surveys to find out how,

where, and why changes should be made.

Changes must be both cautious and aggressive.
Detailed information must be available so that
decisions of great importance to individual
children and to the entire metropolitan area can

be made judiciously.

Research will be an integral and continuing part
of the details in all sections of the report. A few
sample topics for research are listed below.
Similar research will be conducted for each
section of the report.

•

How can the outer city, fringe areas,
and segregated areas be defined in
terms that are workable? How often
should the areas be reclassified and
redefined?

How can the inner city school be made more
attractive to teachers?

•

How can candidates be prepared to meet
admission requirements for apprentice programs?
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FOREWORD
In 1976, the Chicago public schools began the task of preparing a
quality desegregation plan that would improve the educational
opportunities available to all our children. Creating a quality plan
became a challenge to all of us--members of the Board, staff, parents,
community members, civic and business leaders, and the general public.
This challenge has been, and is, to reinvigorate the schools of Chicago,
to make certain that every child has access to the best education we
can provide, to make the Chicago public school system one of the
outstanding examples of what public education can be. The challenge is
to enhance "excellence" in our schools and to give each child full and
open "access" to it. This plan, Access to Excellence, is a dynamic, vital
agenda for meeting that challenge.
The plan is built upon the foundation laid by the City-wide Advisory
Committee, a body established by the Board of Education to ensure
participation of all segments of our citizenry in the formulation of the
plan. The basic concepts established by the Committee during its
months of dedicated labor were presented in their proposed plan,
entitled Equalizing Education Opportunities. The recommendations of
the citizens' representatives are the basis upon which Access to
Excellence has been built.
Access to Excellence reflects the Board of Education's long-standing
commitment to the worth and dignity of the individual, to continuing
and expanding quality education for each and every child, and to
enhancing desegregation. The plan also is educationally sound, reflects
the demographic character of the city, and maintains fiscal
responsibility.
The plan is educationally sound and innovative: it includes several new
and exciting programs and calls for the joint participation of parents,
citizens, and staff in planning, implementing, and evaluating these
programs. At each level of planning, the primary concern is to ensure
that our decisions will contribute to improving the education of all our
children.
The demographic character of the City of Chicago, with over 225
square miles of land area, requires that programs operate in all of our
districts. Therefore, district superintendents and their district
education councils will plan district programs so that every child in our
schools has access to a quality program. Most of these district
programs will result in desegregated educational experiences; the
city-wide programs and administrative initiatives also will increase
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desegregation. During the next five years, the Board of Education plans
to build 25 new school facilities.
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SUMMARY
Access to Excellence is a plan for fulfilling the commitment of the
Board of Education of the City of Chicago to increase quality
educational opportunities for all students, in desegregated settings. The
plan is designed to be realized within five years, by the 1982-83 school
year. During the next school year, 1978-79, the plan projects
approximately 210,000 students learning in desegregated schools or
programs, an increase of 30,000 over the current year.
There are three major parts to the plan:
District Programs - educational initiatives that will be
undertaken by each of the 27 districts to serve primarily, but
not exclusively, the students of the district
System Programs - educational initiatives that will enroll
students from all parts of the city
Administrative Actions - initiatives that give students the
opportunity to extend their school year through the summer,
to enroll in the school of their choice, and to have improved
educational facilities.
In each of the first three parts, the specific programs are described in
short narratives; where appropriate, maps depict where programs will
be located; and charts summarize the estimated numbers of students to
be served during the five years of the plan.
District Programs calls for each district to establish a basic skills
program so that students needing intensive work in reading,
mathematics
gain, and language arts may have access to services that will help
them the skills necessary for further learning. In addition, each
district is to develop and implement a program to serve a particular
need or interest of students in the district. During 1978-79, at least
27 basic skills programs and 27 district-selected programs will be
implemented.
System Programs groups specific activities into six categories:
Academic Interest Centers
Enriched Studies Programs
High School Bilingual Centers
Career Education Programs
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Magnet Schools
Preschool Programs
These programs will serve students from preschool through high
school; they appeal to many diverse interests by offering a broad range
of subjects and instructional approaches; they provide alternatives to
meet the needs of students who are below mastery level as well as to
challenge students who are academically gifted. Every program in every
category is designed to attract a racially and ethnically diverse group of
students with common interests and aspirations.
Administrative Actions provides further opportunities for students:
summer school extends their learning opportunities; permissive
enrollment allows students to seek out the schools in the city that offer
the programs they desire; the removal of mobiles and construction of
new facilities gives students environments conducive to learning.
The core of the plan, at the center of all its parts, is the concept of
"access to excellence": students in Chicago (and their parents) are to be
given the chance to choose from an array of educational alternatives.
This is based upon the belief that each child is an individual, with
individual interests, needs, and potentials. The school system must
offer programs that meet these needs and interests, allowing each child
to develop his or her potential to the fullest. This concept emphasizes
the dignity and uniqueness of each person, as an individual, thereby
encouraging children to see themselves, and others, as individuals
rather than as stereotypes.
The following pages graphically summarize the locations of new and
existing programs during 1978-79, the first year of the plan; the annual
estimated costs for the new programs; and the projected participation
of students during the next five years.
It is to be noted that the Chicago Board of Education is emphasizing
educational excellence in all schools for all students. The Background
highlights the major activities occurring throughout the system to
improve the education of all the children. It also indicates how the
components of this plan, Access to Excellence, are related to the
components in the City-wide Advisory Committee's proposed plan,
Equalizing Educational Opportunities.
This is a plan for voluntary participation, in which desegregation is to
occur as a result of students seeking new educational opportunities.
The plan emphasizes educational excellence, maximum access of
students to outstanding programs, fiscal integrity, and the
establishment of a realistic pace for change.
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DISTRICT PROGRAMS
In order to give every district an opportunity to better serve its
students, this Chapter of the plan calls for each district to plan and
implement:
A basic skills program
A district-selected program
The programs will be designed to meet students' needs and interests,
as perceived by district and school administrators, teachers, and
parents. All programs will be designed to draw students from a racially
and ethnically diverse area.
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ACADEMIC INTEREST CENTERS
Twenty-seven additional academic interest centers will be established
during the next five years; during 1978-79, two existing programs will
be expanded and six new programs will be implemented.
Description
The centers will bring together students of different racial and ethnic
backgrounds to engage in learning activities that advance their
understanding of themselves and others. Two or more groups of
students from different schools will be brought to each center. The
length of time (time cycle) students spend in the center will depend
upon the program's design.
Each center will provide additional resources to create a special
learning environment that does not exist in the individual schools. The
schools that will use each center will usually be within the district or
community in which each center is located. Transportation and food
service will be provided for all centers.
The resources concentrated in each center will include additional
teachers, resource persons, and specialized instruction materials and
equipment.
The instructional program will be designed to be part of one or more of
the areas that are studied in the regular elementary school curriculum.
(Programs are listed on the next page.) The specific program will be
designed by the staff and community of the schools using each center.
Participation
Up to 250 pupils will participate during each time cycle. The total
number of pupils during the first year is projected to be approximately
16,050. Total annual participation by 1982-83 is projected to be 45,800.
Provisions will be made to ensure equal access for pupils of limited
English fluency.
Location
See the list on the next page.
Five-year Time Line
See the list on the next page.
Implementation Schedule

April-May

Provide in-service training for staff.
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June-August
September
October

Develop program components.
Provide liaison to participating schools.
Begin operating centers.
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ADVANCED PLACEMENT PROGRAM
Advanced Placement programs will be opened to all eligible high school
students and will be scheduled during 1978-79 to make them available
to students from other schools. Beginning in 1979-80, clusters of high
schools will be established to permit joint offerings of courses.
Description
The Advanced Placement program offers high school students the
opportunity to earn college credit for work in specific courses as
approved by the College Entrance Examination Board. These courses
are-American History
Art - History
Art - Studio
Biology
Calculus
Chemistry

English
European History
French Language
French Literature
German
Latin

Music
Physics
Spanish Language
Spanish Literature

For 1978-79, Advanced Placement courses will be scheduled at the
beginning and end of the school day, whenever possible, to permit
students from other schools to enroll in the courses. Offerings will be
published and disseminated to all high schools. Carfare will be
provided.
Beginning in 1979-80, clusters of high schools will be established to
ensure access to Advanced Placement courses for all high school
students. During 1978-79, an assessment will be made of current
offerings, locations, and needs, as a basis for establishing programs to
serve the clusters.
Participation
Any eligible high school students may participate. Projected enrollment
for 1978-79 for the current 154 Advanced Placement courses is 4,850 of
which 1,213 would be students from other schools. If additional eligible
students wish to take Advanced Placement courses, new classes will be
opened.
Location
Schools currently offering Advanced Placement courses are listed on
pages 31-32.
Five-year Time Line
1978-79 - Open Advanced Placement to all eligible students.
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1979-80 - Establish clusters with programs.
1980-83 - Establish additional clusters.
Implementation Schedule
April 28

A catalog of Advanced Placement courses for September
1978 published and distributed to all high schools.

June 2

Final day for applications to be received by identified
schools.

June 12

Students notified of acceptance in course.

The estimated cost for 1978-79 is $55,400.
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ENRICHED STUDIES CENTERS
Eight enriched studies centers will be planned and implemented
between 1978-79 and 1982-83.
Description
Enriched studies centers will provide high school students with the
opportunity to pursue a sequenced course of study in a specialized area
as a basis for post-secondary school study or potential career
opportunities.
Schools offering enriched studies programs will provide special
resources either in the school or at other educational, professional, or
public institutions. Students will enroll in the high school offering the
program. Students residing outside the attendance area of the high
school will be provided with carfare.
Enriched studies centers will be established as follows:
Program

Site

Date

Science/mathematics

Lane Tech
Morgan Park
Lindblom
To be determined
To be determined
Marshall
To be determined
To be determined

1979-80
1979-80
1980-81
1979-80
1980-81
1979-80
1980-81
1981-82

Professional Govt. Service
Medical Services
International Studies
Design/creative Arts
Participation

Any high school student may apply to participate in an enriched
studies center. Participants will be selected according to criteria
established by program staff. Students applying for centers in high
schools with admissions criteria must also meet those criteria. Total
participation will be: 1979-80 - 400; 1980-81 - 1,100; 1981-82 -1,500;
1982-83 1,600.
Location
Sites are indicated above.
Five-year Time Line
The schedule for implementing centers is indicated above.
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Implementation Schedule
April-December 1978 Plan and design program.
Promote program; determine entrance criteria;
January-May 1979
distribute applications; identify staff; recruit
students.
Select and notify students.
June 1979

There is no cost in 1978-79.
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PERFORMING AND CREATIVE ARTS CENTERS
Five city-wide centers in the performing and creative arts will be
implemented for approximately 1,100 high school students; three will open
in 1978-79.
Description
The programs will offer a sequenced study of art, music, theatre, or dance,
with an emphasis on production rather than history or aesthetics.
Students will have opportunities to study and work with professional
artists, and will perform or exhibit their works. Students will be enrolled
in the high school offering the program.
A regular schedule of activities will be developed at Whitney M. Young,
Jr., in cooperation with the Chicago Symphony Orchestra. Students in
programs at other centers will also participate in these activities. Similar
cooperative relationships will be developed at the centers with other
professional arts organizations.
Participation
The first year projection is for 100 to 150 students to participate at each
of three sites. All high school students in the city will be eligible to apply;
participants will be selected by program staff, according to criteria
established by staff. Provisions will be made to ensure equal access for
students of limited English fluency.
Location
Whitney Young, Jr., 211 South Laflin Avenue, (District 9)
Martin Luther King, Jr., 4445 South Drexel Boulevard, (District 23)
Marie S. Curie, 4959 South Archer Avenue, (District 12)
William H. Taft, 6545 West Hurlbut Street, (District 1)
South Shore Country Park, (South Shore High School, 7529
South Constance Avenue, (District 22)
Five-year Time Line
1978-79

-

1979-80
1980-83

-

Begin three programs: Young, King, and South Shore
Country Park.
Expand existing programs; begin Curie and Taft programs.
Operate and evaluate programs.

Implementation Schedule
April-May

Promote program; determine entrance criteria;
distribute applications; identify staff; recruit students.
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June2

Final day for receiving applications at identified
schools.

June 12

Students notified of acceptance into program.

The estimated cost for 1978-79 is $532,500.
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CENTERS FOR LANGUAGES
A languages program will be established in several locations throughout
the city to serve upper grade and high school students.
Description
The program will emphasize the development of bilingualism, knowledge
of other cultures, and career opportunities. Daily instruction in a foreign
or second language will be provided for an academically and linguistically
diverse student population.
The following languages will be offered at eleven centers: Arabic, Chinese,
English, French, German, Greek, Hebrew, Italian, Japanese, Korean,
Latin, Polish, Russian, Spanish, and Swahili. Each center will offer
instruction in at least two languages.
Participation
Approximately 1,000 upper grade and high school students will be served
the first year, with 100 students at each of five centers and 500 students
at Waller High School.
High school students will enroll at the school in which the center is
located; upper grade students will attend the center but be enrolled in
their home schools.
Location
Waller, Curie, Harrison, Hyde Park, Juarez, and Kenwood high schools
will have centers the first year. In the second year, additional sites will be
opened at Taft, Lake View, Schurz, Morgan Park, and Marshall high
schools.
Five Year Time Line
1978-79
1979-80
1981-83

Establish six sites.
Establish five additional sites, serving 100 students
each; increase other centers to 200 students.
Operate programs; assess and modify as necessary.
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Implementation Schedule
April-August
September
October

Select staff; recruit students; order materials; conduct
preservice training for staff.
Complete student selection; notify students.
Begin program operation.

The estimated cost for 1978-79 is $1,003,500.
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HIGH SCHOOL BILINGUAL CENTERS
Eleven high schools will offer bilingual programs for students of limited
English fluency who are currently enrolled in schools serving fewer than
40 students of the same language background.
Description
Nineteen bilingual centers will be initiated or expanded in eleven high
schools to consolidate resources and offer a more extensive program. The
languages for which programs will be offered are Arabic, Assyrian,
Cantonese, French, Greek, Italian, Korean, Polish, Spanish, and
Vietnamese.
The instructional program will consist of courses offered in the native
language as well as special classes in English as a second language. The
Students will participate in the curriculum offering of the selected school
for their other required courses. Selected components of the program will
be offered to students fluent in English who are already enrolled in the
school. Bilingual resource centers will be established in schools with space
available.
Participation
High school students with limited English fluency, who have any of the
above-mentioned language backgrounds and are currently enrolled in
schools serving less than 40 students, may apply for enrollment at one of
the schools. Admission will be on a first-come, first-served basis. Students
fluent in English may also participate in the program. Projected
participation the first year is 2,360.
Location
The programs will be located at the sites listed on the following page,
according to the time line indicated.
Five-Year Time Line
1978-79
1979-80
1980-81
1981-83

Establish 15 centers at 9 sites.
Establish 3 centers. Analyze results of annual
language survey for selection of additional centers.
Establish one center. Analyze results of annual
language survey for selection of additional centers.
Analyze results of annual language survey for
selection of additional sites.
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Implementation Schedule
April-May

Identify high school students and eighth grade pupils who
may be eligible for participation. Prepare and distribute
materials to district offices, schools, and parents; meet
with human relations coordinators, district
superintendents, and other field staff; meet with parents,
complete distribution of applications; promote program.

June 2

Last day for receiving applications.

June 12

Notify parents of approved transfers; inform sending
school principals of approved transfers.

September

Implement programs.

The estimated cost for 1978-79 is $522,600. This is in addition to the
regular state allocation for bilingual education.
Language

School

Arabic

Curie
Amundsen
Senn
Von Steuben
Senn
Mid-southwest Career
Bowen
Amundsen
Steinmetz
Mather
Senn
Schurz
Kelly
Curie
Senn
Schurz
Bowen
Roosevelt
Senn

Assyrian
Cantonese
French
Greek
Italian
Korean
Polish
Spanish

Vietnamese

District

Date

12
3
24
1
24
26
17
3
4
2
24
5
12
12
24
5
17
1
24

1979-80
1979-80
1978-79
1978-79
1978-79
1980-81
1978-79
1978-79
1978-79
1978-79
1978-79
1978-79
1978-79
1979-80
1978-79
1978-79
1978-79
1978-79
1978-79
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CAREER DEVELOPMENT CENTERS
Twenty-one career development centers will be implemented or expanded
during 1978-79, to serve high school sophomores and juniors; six
additional centers will be implemented in 1979-80, to serve seniors.
Description
Seven programs will be offered to provide high school sophomores with
increased awareness of career opportunities in selected fields, through the
equivalent of seven half-days of study at the center. These programs will
be in the following fields:
Marketing and Retailing
Industrial Occupations
Urban Government
Military Occupations
Urban Energy and Utilities
Entrepreneurship and Small Business
HoteVmotel Occupations
Fourteen programs will provide high school juniors with intensive study
of selected career fields, through one semester of half-day sessions at the
center. These programs will be in the following career fields:
Design
Energy/environmental
Management Study
· Architecture and Urban
Planning
Urban Studies
Maritime Studies
Government/international
Languages

Life/health Sciences Studies
Management Studies
Law and Justice Studies
Economic/business Studies
Urban Communications Studies
Air Transportation Studies
HoteVmotel Studies
Retailing and Merchandising

During the second year, senior level programs will be established in six
fields to permit students to undertake advanced studies. The fields are as
follows:
Banking
Management and Leadership Development
Architecture
Urban Studies
Energy/Environmental Management
Accounting
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Participation
During 1978-79, approximately 6,270 high school students will be able to
participate: 870 juniors and 5,400 sophomores. Participants will be
recruited city-wide through a dissemination-recruitment program.
Provisions will be made to ensure equal access for students of limited
English-speaking fluency.
Location
The programs will be housed at various businesses and government
agencies, which will act as co-sponsors of the centers through their
contributions of equipment and resources. Transportation expenses will
be reimbursed to the participating students.
Five-year Time Line
1978-79
1979-80
1980-83

Implement 21 career development centers.
Implement 6 centers; expand existing centers.
Assess programs; implement new centers and modify
existing centers as appropriate.

Implementation Schedule
April-June

Prepare information and guideline booklet
and student application forms; promote
program.

May-August

Select and provide preservice training for
staff; receive and screen students'
applications.

September

Complete meetings with liaison persons;
notify students of acceptance.

October 2

Begin classes in 8 programs.

March 1

Begin classes in remaining programs.

The estimated cost for 1978-79 is $569,300.
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TECHNICAL CENTERS
Seventeen technical centers will be established to provide students with
in-depth study in identified job growth fields. Twelve centers will open in
1978-79.
Description
The technical center is an extension of the career development center
concept, providing students with opportunities for extended study in job
growth fields. With the assistance of the Chicago Association of
Commerce and Industry and Chicago United, career opportunities will be
assessed to provide program direction.
During 1978-79, the following centers will be established:
Grades
Participating
Communication Science Technology
Air Transportation
Energy/environmental Management
Carpentry Pre-apprentice
Business Management
Business Management
Computer Science
Computer Science
Computer Science
Management Leadership Science
Technological Development
Technological Development

Illinois Bell
Midway
Navy Pier
Harrison
Carver
Orr
Harrison
Steinmetz
Fenger
Harrison
Corliss
Julian

11,
11,
11,
11,

12
12
12
12
9
9
9

11, 12
11, 12
9

11, 12
11, 12

Three additional centers will be opened in 1979-80: in Technological
Development at Wells High School, in Business Management at Robeson
High School, and in Hotel and Restaurant Management at Manley High
School. Two additional centers will be opened in 1980-81 in Electronics
and Horticulture.
Participation
During the first year the 12 new centers will serve up to 1,495 students.
Participation is projected to increase at the following rate: 1979-80 1,980;
1980-81 - 2,220; 1981-82 - 2,400; 1982-83 - 2,640.
Locations
Locations are listed above. Sites for the three programs to be started in
1980-81 are to be determined.

138

Five-year Time Line
1978-79 - Open 12 technical centers.
1979-80 - Open three centers.
1980-81 - Open two centers, incorporate three centers at Harrison into
new technical institute.
Implementation Schedule
May-August

Select staff; provide inservice training
activities;
order materials and
equipment; recruit students.

September

Begin program.

May

Recruit students.

The estimated cost for 1978-79 is $2,068,880.
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WHITNEY M. YOUNG, JR., MAGNET SCHOOL
The Whitney M. Young, Jr., Magnet School will be established as a grade
7 to 12 citywide school for college preparation, with competitive
admissions.
Description
All students are entitled to have access to high quality programs meeting
their particular needs and abilities. Whitney M. Young, Jr.,Magnet School
will become a school for academically talented students throughout the
city, offering them a challenging curriculum, personalized instruction, and
a desegregated learning environment. The transition to a grade 7 to 12
school will begin in September 1979 and will be completed by September
1981.
The instructional program will emphasize the intensive study of English,
music, mathematics, science, the arts, social studies, and foreign
languages, with a diminished emphasis on business, vocational subjects,
and health occupations.
Bilingual services will be provided as needed to ensure all students equal
access to the school. Students currently enrolled at Whitney Young may
complete the program in which they are currently enrolled.
Participation
All pupils in grade 6 will be eligible to apply for admission. A competitive
examination will be administered to select the most academically talented
students. The admissions procedures will contain provisions for inclusion
of academically talented students who are of limited English speaking
fluency. Admissions will also be based on the racial and ethnic
proportions established for Whitney M. Young, Jr., to the maximum
extent feasible.
Enrollment in grade 7 will be approximately 350 pupils per year; the
maximum enrollment for all six grades will be 2,300 students.
Transportation will be provided for all students.
Location
Whitney M. Young, Jr., High School, 211 South Laflin Avenue (District 9).

Five-year Time Line
1979-80 - Accept 200 students each in grades 7, 8, and 9.
1980-81 - Accept 350 students in grade 7.
1981-82 - Accept 350 students in grade 7.
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1982-83 - Operate program.
Implementation Schedule
June 1978-January 1979

Plan program.

September-December 1979

Meet with community to explain
program and admissions procedures.

January 1979

Distribute admissions information.

March 1979

Select staff and meet to formulate
program and choose materials.

April 1979

Administer admissions tests; process
tests and select students.

May 1979

Notify accepted students.

July-August 1979

Provide preservice for staff and prepare
curriculum; meet with parents and
community groups to publicize
developing program.

September 1978

Begin program.

The estimated cost for 1979-80 is $506,000.
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NORTH SIDE CAREER HIGH SCHOOL
A new high school will be opened in September 1979 and will provide
opportunities for study in five career fields.
Description
The new high school will offer sequences of courses in the following fields:
Hotel and restaurant management
Horticultural studies and landscaping
Auto mechanics and body repair; small engine repair
Industrial trades, including pre-apprentice programs
Business occupations
These programs will be developed and equipped to make them attractive
to students having a commitment and interest in these fields. A ten-week
exploratory course will be offered so that students can confirm their
career interests. The school will also offer a full range of general courses.
Participation
These programs are open to students from the entire city. Total
enrollment in 1979-80 is projected at 1,000. Provisions will be made to
ensure equal access for students with limited English-speaking fluency.
Location
A new facility is being built at North and Ogden avenues, District 7.(A
new name will be proposed for this facility.)
Five-year Time Line
1978-79 - Complete construction; plan programs.
1979-80 - Establish programs, 75-100 students in each field.
1980-83 - Operate and expand programs.
Implementation Schedule
January-June 1979

Publicize school.

March-June 1979

Recruit faculty and students.

May-June 1979

Orient parents and staff.

June-September 1979

Install specialized equipment.

August 1979

Provide preservice activities for staff.
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The estimated cost for 1978-79 for planning is $40,000. The estimated
cost for 1979-80 for operation is $2,275,000.
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MID-SOUTHWEST CAREER HIGH SCHOOL
A new high school will be opened in September 1980 and will provide
opportunities for study in business education and cosmetology.
The school will have a basic core of labs in which emphasis will be placed
on business education and cosmetology for 700 students from across the
city. Cosmetology will be taught in Spanish for limited English-speaking
and bilingual Spanish students.
The curriculum for business education will include business machine
practices, computer services, typing, accounting, business English, and
work experience courses. The cosmetology sequence will provide theory
and laboratory experience to meet State of Illinois licensing requirements.
Participation
Fifteen hundred students from throughout the city will enroll in these two
career areas. The students will enroll for the full schoolday for four years
in the business education program and for three years in the cosmetology
program (beginning at the sophomore level).
Location A new vocational high school is being constructed at 31st Street
and Western Avenue, District 26. (A new name will be proposed for this
facility.)
Five-year Time Line
1978-79
1979-80
1980-81
1981-83

-

Obtain site.
Complete drawings; let bid; assign contractor.
Complete construction; implement program.
Program is operational.

Implementation Schedule
March-May 1980

Publicize the programs and recruit
students.

May-June 1980

Hold orientations for
students.

May-July 1980

Assign staff.

August-September 1980

Provide inservice activities for staff.

parents

and

There is no cost for 1978-79. The estimated cost for 1979-80 for planning
is $345,000. The estimated cost for 1980-81 for operation is$1,000,000.
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CHICAGO CENTRAL TECHNICAL INSTITUTE
The Harrison High School will be reorganized over five years as the
Chicago Central Technical Institute.
Description
The Chicago Central Technical Institute will offer a program with three
major areas of emphasis:
Basic skills development
College preparation
Technical skills development
The basic skills development program will provide students below grade
level mastery with intensive instruction in reading, mathematics, and
language arts. A peer counseling program will be included, and the
existing peer culture development program will be maintained. The
four-year college preparation program will be open to all students at
mastery level.
The four-year technical skills development program will include the
following:
Computer Science
Additional career fields (based on assessment of job opportunities)
Logistics: the movement and management of resources for business
and industry
Foreign languages
Management/leadership Science
The technical centers established in 1978-79 at Harrison will be
incorporated into the Chicago Central Technical Institute in 1980-81.
Students graduating from Chicago Central Technical Institute will be
prepared to continue their education in college or further technical
programs, or to be employed in an early management-level or technical
position. Facility in a foreign language will promote access to
international as well as domestic job opportunities.
Participation
Open to high school students from the entire city. Total participation will
be 1,500 students.
Location
The present Harrison
Boulevard,District 19.

High

School,

2850

West

24th

Street
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Five-year Time Line/Implementation Schedule
1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 -

Implement basic skills and technical skills programs;
enroll 400 students.
Expand programs; introduce new programs; add 400
students.
Expand all programs; add 400 students.
Expand all programs; add 400 students.
Programs are operational.

The estimated cost for 1979-80 is $1,050,000. Costs for the technical
skills programs are included in the budget for Technical Centers.
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SIX-YEAR HIGH SCHOOL PROGRAM
Chicago High School for Metropolitan Studies will be expanded to offer
high school instruction to part-time students.
Description
In order to permit young adults to work and at the same time complete
their high school education, the Chicago High School for Metropolitan
Studies will expand its instructional program and time schedule,beginning
in September 1979.
Classes will be offered from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m., Monday through Friday,and
from 9:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. on Saturday.
Teachers will be scheduled for regular teaching loads, as established by
the Board of Education.
Participation
The equivalent of 600 full-time students will be enrolled; the actual
enrollment will be significantly greater because of the large number of
part-time students anticipated. Total enrollment is projected at
approximately 1,000, by 1980-81.
Location
Site to be determined.
Five-year Time Line
1978-79 1979-80 1980-83 -

Continue present full-time programs; plan part-time
program.
Enroll part-time students.
Operate program.

Implementation Schedule
April 1979

Conduct meetings with key school and district staffs.
Meet with communities to explain and prepare
program.
Publicize program.

May-June 1979

Identify personnel.

August 1979

Provide preservice activities for staff.
Recruit and identify students.

September

Register students.
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Cost
The estimated cost for 1979-80 is $490,500.

149

DYETT ENVIRONMENTAL MAGNET SCHOOL
The Walter H. Dyett Middle School will become a kindergarten through
grade eight school, similar to the Disney Magnet School.
Description
The Dyett Environmental Magnet School will provide a program of
individualized instruction in a desegregated setting serving approximately
1,250 pupils. The curriculum will emphasize an understanding of urban
interdependence and diversity, and the attainment of competence in urban
life skills. The resources of the city will be used as the basis for a program
of academic excellence,attracting students from throughout the city.
Participation
Pupils will be computer-selected by age, race, and socioeconomic status to
reflect the racial and economic diversity of the city. Initial enrollment will
be 650 students; maximum enrollment will be 1,250, by 1981-82.
Location
Dyett Middle School, 555 East 51st Street (District 13)
Five-year Time Line
1978-79 1979-80
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83

-

Phase out 45-15 program; phase in pre-operational
program
Open new school program, with 650 students
Add 300 students
Add 300 students
Program is operational.

Implementation Schedule
April-September 1978

Plan and design program.

October-March 1978-79

Implement procedures for new program.
Community meetings will be held to plan
for new education program
implementation.
Identify staff and pupils to participate in
activity planning. Meet with key staff to
plan curriculum implementation
activities.

Summer 1979

Provide preservice activities for staff.

1979-80

Program is operational.
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The estimated cost for 1978-79 for planning and building changes is
$410,000; the estimated cost for 1979-80 for operation is $983,400.
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CLASSICAL SCHOOLS
Six classical schools will be established during the next two years to
provide a challenging course of instruction for kindergarten through sixth
grade pupils with high academic potential.
The classical schools will provide an instructional program which is highly
structured for achievement in the four major disciplines:science,
mathematics, social studies, and language arts; strongly emphasizes the
fine arts; and provides a vigorous physical education program geared to
sound individual development.
The classical concept of a sound mind in a sound body with aesthetic
appreciation will characterize the instructional program of the classical
school. The ideal is a well-proportioned individual. The philosophy which
undergirds this concept is that of balance in the development of the
cognitive, aesthetic, and physical growth of each child.
Classes will be organized on a nongraded, multi-aged basis according to
the Continuous Progress-mastery Learning program. Staffing will be
based upon the established pupil-teacher ratios, with the addition of two
master teachers trained in the classical approach to serve as inservice
leaders as well as to teach students. A six-week staff development
program will be conducted in the summer for the teachers.
Graduating students will be eligible to attend the Whitney M. Young,Jr.,
Magnet School without examination.
Students currently enrolled in the designated schools will be eligible to
participate in the classical program. Other students will be admitted on
the basis of objective criteria to be developed. Provisions will be made to
ensure equal access for students of limited English proficiency. The
schools will serve approximately 1,700 students.During the first year,
three schools will serve 100 students each.Transportation will be provided
as necessary.
Location
Classical schools will be established at the following locations:
Lucy Perkins, 6918 West Strong Street, (District 1)
William Green, 3021 West Devon Avenue, (District 2)
James McDade, 8801 South Indiana Avenue (District 16)
One site in District 9
One site in District 14
One site in District 15
These schools will be renamed.
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Five-year Time Line
1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-83 -

Perkins, Green, and McDade open as classical schools,
100 students each.
Perkins, Green, and McDade serve 200 each. Open
District 9 (150), District 15 (200), and District 14 (300)
schools.
Add 100 students at District 9 school.
Operate programs.

Implementation Schedule
April-May

Meet with community to explain program and
admissions procedures; distribute applications for
admission; develop standards for admissions.

June2

Deadline for applications at schools.

May-June

Select staff and materials.

June 1

Accepted students notified.

July-August

Provide preservice training for staff and prepare
curriculum; meet with parents and community groups
to publicize developing program.

September

Program begins.

The estimated cost for 1978-79 is $227,800.
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PRESCHOOL PROGRAMS
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PRESCHOOL CENTERS
Ten preschool centers for 3- and 4-year-old children will be opened in
existing and new facilities; each center will serve 80 to 100 children.
Description
Centers will contain four to five classrooms; each class will enroll up to
20 children. Class sessions will be full-day. Pupils will engage in
sensory-motor development, socialization, and reading readiness activities.
Continuing parent involvement will be an integral part of the program.
Transportation will be provided as necessary.
Two centers will be opened each year for the next five years.
Participation
The centers will be open to children from all parts of the city.Participants
will be selected by a lottery system, on the basis of established proportions
for socioeconomic and racial and ethnic characteristics. The maximum
participation for 1978-79 will be 200 students.
Location
1978-79 1979-83 -

Drake, 2722 South King Drive, (District 11), and
Lemoyne, 851 West Waveland Avenue, (District 3).
2 additional sites each year, to be determined.

Five-year Time Line
1978-79 1979-83 -

Open two centers; plan for additional centers.
Open two additional centers each year.

Implementation Schedule
April 1978-January 1979

Modernize two centers; order furniture,
equipment, and supplies; recruit staff;
publicize program; select pupils by
lottery; schedule regular parental
involvement; provide preservice activities
for staff.

The estimated cost for 1978-79 is $883,200.
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VON HUMBOLDT CHILD-PARENT CENTER
A child-parent center will be opened near the Von Humboldt School to
serve approximately 180 pupils.
Description
The child-parent center will offer an instructional program for children
from three to six years old. Children will be taught basic language,
mathematics, and other skills, and receive instruction in art, music,
hygiene, and social interaction with other persons. In addition, children
will be involved in activities that promote positive attitudes toward
themselves, others, and school.
Bilingual instruction and multicultural activities will also be a part of the
instructional program.
Parents will attend the center with their children and receive training in
homemaking. The center is staffed with a head teacher, teachers, a nurse,
and a social worker. The center will draw pupils from a variety of racial
and ethnic groups and social and economic backgrounds.
Participation
Approximately 180 children will be enrolled in half-day sessions for one
school year.
Location
A new building is under construction at 1339-1355 North Rockwell
Avenue (District 6).

Five-year Time Line
1978-79 1979-83 -

Open child-parent center, September 1978.
Program is operational.

Implementation Schedule
July-September 1978

Provide inservice activities for staff.

September 1978

Implement program.

The estimated cost for 1978-79 is $674,500.
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HIGH SCHOOL PERMISSIVE ENROLLMENT
High school students will be given the opportunity to enroll in any general
high school having available space, through a two-stage program:
I -

permissive transfer for students in overcrowded high schools

II -

open enrollment for other high school students.

Description
Admission to the general high schools will be open to all categories of
eligible students, according to the fallowing priority list:
A.
B.
C.
D.

Students residing in the school's attendance area
Students transferring from Gage Park or Morgan Park
Students from overcrowded high schools
Any other eligible high school students.

Transfers for priorities C and D will be on a first-come, first-served basis.
The number of students transferring to a receiving school will be within
the capacity (100%) of the school and will not alter the receiving school's
raciaVethnic composition by more than 15 percent.High school students
transferring will be provided with carfare.
Transfer students will become regular members of the receiving school's
student body, and are not unilaterally transferable. Parents may, under
extenuating circumstances, request that their children be transferred back
to the sending school.
For each student transferring under priorities C and D, the receiving
school will receive up to $900 to provide special services for the student.
Participation
I.

Students in the overcrowded (sending) schools listed on p. 97. may
apply for admission to any of the receiving schools listed. They will
be enrolled after priorities A and B. The number of students
eligible for participation in Stage I is 2,896.

II.

Students who will be in grade 9 in September and other high school
students may apply for admission to any receiving high school with
available space, providing their enrollment will enhance the
desegregation of the receiving schools. They will be enrolled after -·
priorities A, B, and C.
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No child presently placed or recommended for placement in a mentally
handicapped division or social adjustment division will be eligible to
participate.
In 1977-78, a total of 629 high school students participated in permissive
transfer.
Location
Sending and receiving schools are listed on p. 97.
Five-year Time Line
The maximum participation for 1978-79 is 3,094 students.Projections for
the following four years cannot be made until the effectiveness of other
programs in the plan is determined.
Implementation Schedule
April-May

Prepare and distribute materials to
district offices, schools, and parents;
meet with human relations coordinators,
district superintendents, and other field
staff; meet with parents; complete
distribution of Stage I - permissive
transfer applications.

May26

Last day for rece1vmg Stage
applications for early notification.

May 29-June 2

Notify parents of Stage I transfers
approved; inform sending and receiving
school principals of Stage I transfers
approved. Publish list of spaces available
for Stage II - open enrollment; distribute
applications.

June 16

Last day for
applications.

July 1

Notify parents of Stage II transfers
approved; inform sending and receiving
school principals of Stage II transfers
approved.

July-August

Continue to receive applications at
district offices.

receiving

Stage

I

II
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The estimated cost for 1978-79 is $3,082,000.
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STATISTICAL DATA - 'J:1 DISTRICTS
1.
2.
3.
4.

Student membenhip in the districts ranges from 9,027 to 28,440, a difference of 19,413.•
The number of teachers in the distri.cta ranges from 441 to 1,482, a difference of 1,041.
The number of achool principals in the distri.cta ranges from 10 to 29, a difference of 19.
The number oC achools in the distri.cta ranges from 12 to 32, a difference of 20.

MEMBERSHIP

SCHOOLS

DIST.

ELEM

H.S

TOTAL

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

11,156
5,993
11,434
22,557
17,679
20,758
10,134
11,638
12,195
13,390
11,399
11,021
11,979
12,607
17,982
9,716
10,529
12,936
15,493
13,345
12,357
16,629
6,751
10,568
13,636
10,762
13,021

5,679
3,034
7,917
5,883
8,308
5,856
2,803
3,680
6,569
2,657
5,664
9,256
2,425
4,535
8,389
7,292
5,115
4,863
7,208
4,992
4,262
4,389
2,423
2,465
4,957
3,264
7,725

16,835
9,0'J:1
19,351
28,«o
25,987
26,614
12,937
15,318
18,764
16,047
17,063
20,277
14,404
17,142
26,371
17,008
15,6«
17,799
22,701
18,337
16,619
21,018
9,216
13,033
18,593
14,026
20,746

23
24
25
26
'J:1

B&Nd on student membership data fur January 31, 1979.

ELEM

H.S

26
10
18
29
25
27
19
17
23
17
20
26
17
20
26
18
21
23
25
16
18
20
16
15
16
15
17

3
2
3
3
5
2
4
2
5
1
2
4
1
2
4
2
3
2
5
2
2
2
1
1
3
2
3

TOTAL
29
12
21
32
30
29

23
19
28
18
22
30
18
22
30
20
24
25
30
18
20
22
17
16
19
17
20

%NON-MINORITY
75.8
65.2
56.7
25.8
59.6
12.9
17.5
0.1
6.8
2.9
0.6
69.8
5.6
35.5

u

29.2
19.7
12.7
0.1
0.7
0.8
0.1
38.7
5.5
23.6
0.3

%MINORITY PRINCIPALS# TEACHERS
24.2
34.8
43.3
74.2
40.4
87.1
82.5
99.9
93.2
97.1
99.4
30.2
100.0
9U
64.5
98.6
70.8
80.3
87.3
99.9
98.0
99.2
99.9
61.3
94.5
76.4
99.7

22
10
21
29
28
25
19
18
24
15
19
26
15
19
25
17
18
20
'J:1
17
18
21
14
13
18
15
18

805
«1
1,043
1,482
1,157
1,449
708
829
1,335
793
900
1,056
767
919
1,'J:14

803
770
889
1,206
849
851
1,001
504
755
1,035
740
1,045
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STATISTICAL DATA - 20 DISTRICTS

1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

The number of districts is reduced from 27 to 20.
Student membership in the districts ranges from 23, 102 to 25,120, a difference of 2,018. •
The number of teachers in the districts ranges from 1,142 to 1,593, a difference of 451.
The number of school principals in the districts ranges from 22 to 33, a difference of 11.
The number of schools in the districts ranges from 25 to 43, a difference of 18.

DIST.

ELEM

H.S

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

18,491
17,982
17,232
15,204
21,266
18,489
18,911
15,393
16,121
19,440
15,397
15,898
19,017
17,104
16,472
15,579
20,107
19,871
13,930
14,477

5,850
7,138
7,788
9,328
3,777
5,856
6,009
9,254
8,655
5,152
7,712
7,204
5,137
7,133
8,389
9,254
4,262
4,863
10,457
9,675

TOTAL

ELEM

H.S

39

4
4
4
4
2
2
3
6
6
2
5
3
2
3
4
4
2
2
5
4

24,341
25,120
25,020
24,532
25,043
24,345
24,920
24,647
24,776
24,592
23,109
23,102
24,154
24,237
24,861
24,833
24,369
24,734
24,387
24,152

• Baaed on student membership data for January 31, 1979.

29
29

21
25
26
26
28
28
23
26
25
28
33
26
23
25
35
26
21

TOTAL
43
33
33
25
27
28
29

34
34
25
31
28
30
36
30

27
27
37
31
25

%NON-MINORITY
73
51
38
49
38
12
1
19
4
12
11
47
6
4
40
1
1
14
6
13

%MINORITY PRINCIPALS# TEACHERS
27
49
62
51
62
88
99
81
96
88
89
53

94
96
60

99
99
86
94
87

34
27
29

25
27
25
24
30
30
23
28
24
25
31
23
26
25
31
23
22

1,150
1,354
1,371
1,200
1,226
1,348
1,450
1,372
1,593
1,204
1,186
1,285
1,333
1,324
1,142
1,177
1,163
1,170
1,144
1,212
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